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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has lost its ability to base its legitimacy solely on its legal 
expertise, yet it has gained public support as a new source to legitimize its authority.  Due to 
growing public understanding that legal expertise does not award the Court with determinate 
answers, the Court has partly lost expertise as a source of legitimacy.  The idea that judges decide 
salient cases based on their political preferences has become part of the common perception and has 
eroded the Court’s image as an expert in the public mind.  On the other hand, as a result of the 
invention of scientific public opinion polls and their current centrality in the public mind, the 
Court has now available a new source of legitimacy.  Thanks to public opinion polls that measure 
public support for the Court, the Court for the first time in its history, has now an independent 
and public metric demonstrating its public support.  The monopoly elected institutions had on 
claiming to hold public mandate has been broken.  As a result of these changes, as well as the 
lessons the Court took from the Lochner decisional line and Brown, an important shift in the 
political balance of power and subsequently in the Rehnquist Court’s understanding of its own 
sources of legitimacy occurred. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a democracy, institutions have two potential sources of legiti-
macy.  The first is popular support; the second is expertise.1  In this 
Article, I tell the story of how the Supreme Court of the United States 
partly lost the ability to base its legitimacy on the latter and gained 
the ability to base its legitimacy on former.  I also argue that the 
Court indeed adopted public support as its basis of legitimacy during 
the Rehnquist Court years. 
In the following, I do not attempt to examine the normative valid-
ity of popular support as a source of legitimacy for the Court.2  My 
aim is merely to show how the rise of public opinion polls as an au-
thoritative democratic legitimator in American “social imaginary”3 
created a shift in the balance of power between the three branches of 
government.  The Court, now less remote from public opinion than 
ever before, can base its legitimacy on the master before whom all 
tremble.4 
I begin the Article with a short discussion of the term “legitimacy.”  
I then describe the rise of public opinion polls, measuring the 
Court’s public support, as a mechanism that allowed the Court, for 
the first time in its history, to base its legitimacy on public support.  I 
continue by describing other developments that, together with the 
rise of public opinion polls, led the Rehnquist Court to adopt a new 
 
 1 See YARON EZRAHI, IMAGINED DEMOCRACIES:  NECESSARY POLITICAL FICTIONS 262 (2012) 
(discussing the “two distinct and often competing sources of authority in public affairs:  
knowledge and participation”); James L. Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging:  Are Politi-
cians in Robes Inevitably Illegitimate?, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?:  WHAT JUDGES 
DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 281, 284 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) 
(arguing that “[i]n a democratic society, the principal sources of legitimacy for political 
institutions are elections and accountability” but in the absence of an electoral connec-
tion, courts base their legitimacy on expertise). 
 2 For such an examination see Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Diffi-
culty?, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13 (2013). 
 3  See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004). 
 4 See 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 263 (Liberty Fund 1995) (1888) 
(“Public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the great source of power, the master 
of servants who tremble before it.”). 
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understanding of its sources of legitimacy.  These developments in-
clude the decline of the Court’s image as an expert in the public 
mind and the particular lessons it adopted from the Lochner and 
Brown decisional lines.  Next, I conceptualize the Rehnquist Court’s 
new understanding of its legitimacy.  Before concluding, I situate my 
argument in relation to recent theories that attempt to explain the 
Rehnquist Court’s majoritarian tendencies and yet fail to detect the 
vital influence of the rise of public opinion polls. 
I.  LEGITIMACY 
In the context of the Supreme Court’s authority, the normative 
aspect of its institutional legitimacy deals with the justification of the 
Court’s authority.5  The sociological aspect of its institutional legiti-
macy deals with the trust or enduring support that the public actually 
awards the Court over a relatively long period of time.6 
Arguing that the Court’s normative legitimacy is based on its ex-
pertise means that the Court holds special knowledge or a special po-
sition which makes it particularly suited to assist in fulfilling a worthy 
goal.7  These goals must be anchored in the Constitution and include 
projects such as protecting society’s principled values, guarding dis-
advantaged groups of society, preserving democratic procedures, and 
guarding certain basic moral values.8  Yet, in discussing the Court’s 
institutional normative legitimacy, the focus is not on examining the 
worthiness of the goal.  Assuming that the goal is normatively worthy, 
 
 5 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) 
(analyzing three concepts of legitimacy:  legal, sociological, and moral). 
 6 See, e.g., C.K. Ansell, Legitimacy:  Political, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
& BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8704–06 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001); Fallon, su-
pra note 5, at 1790–91, 1794–96, 1828 (“When legitimacy is measured in sociological 
terms . . .   [an institution] possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar as the relevant 
public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support . . . .”); James 
L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the 
United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 358 (2003) (characterizing institutional 
legitimacy as, among other things, “a generalized trust that the institution will perform 
acceptably in the future”). 
 7 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 24 (1962); Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 333, 343–44 (2012) (analyzing the typical format of normative justi-
fications for the countermajoritarian difficulties created by the Court). 
 8 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 705 (2002) (“For many years now, constitutional scholars have been de-
veloping theories of the Constitution.  These theories generally make both descriptive 
and normative claims.  Descriptively, the theories argue that the Constitution promotes a 
single political principle.  Normatively, they assert that this principle is a desirable way to 
govern the nation.”). 
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the question is whether it is justified to give an expert Court the au-
thority to protect it.  If the Court can offer a special contribution in 
achieving the goal based on its expertise in fields such as legal-
doctrinal analysis, human rights, or history, then its authority may be 
justified.9  The Court can also have expertise that is based merely on 
its insular position or detachment from politics.10 
Arguing that the Court has normative legitimacy based on popu-
lar support means that due to enduring public support of the Court 
(or diffuse support in scholarly jargon), it is justified that the Court 
will have authority to decide on certain controversies.  In this Article, 
I argue that until recent decades, the option of basing the Court’s 
normative legitimacy on popular support for the Court was not really 
on the table.  Without an accepted metric to measure public support 
for the Court, one would find it extremely hard to argue that the 
Court’s authority is justified by its enduring public support.  The 
Court was, of course, interested in public opinion throughout its his-
tory, but before the invention of public opinion polls, elected repre-
sentatives had a monopoly on the claim to legitimacy based on public 
support.  In this institutional dynamic, the Court could hardly rely on 
its own source of popular support and had to revert to its expertise. 
Sociological (or descriptive) institutional legitimacy is a concept 
that aims to describe the enduring popular support for the Court, 
i.e., the public’s institutional loyalty.  This diffuse support for the 
Court extends beyond mere satisfaction with a particular decision of 
the Court, i.e., its specific support.11  In the scholarly arena, argu-
ments still persist on the exact definition of sociological legitimacy 
and the precise polling questions required to measure the public dif-
fuse support for the Court.12  Yet, in recent decades, the metric meas-
uring public confidence for the Court has gained the status of an au-
thoritative indicator of the Court’s sociological legitimacy in the 
public discourse.13 
 
 9 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 343–50 (examining scholarly justifications for the Court’s 
countermajoritation authority). 
 10 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (1982) 
(“As a matter of comparative institutional competence, the politically insulated federal 
judiciary is more likely, when the human rights issue is a deeply controversial one, to 
move us in the direction of a right answer . . . than is the political process left to its own 
devices . . . .”). 
 11 James L. Gibson, Public Images and Understandings of Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 828, 837 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). 
 12 See, e.g., Gibson et al., supra note 6, at 358 (characterizing sociological institutional legiti-
macy). 
 13 See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 125 (2011) (arguing that the 
public confidence metric “is the most reliable and consistent way to capture public sup-
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In the following Part, I describe how a technological develop-
ment—the invention of scientific public opinion polls—shifted the 
manner in which the Court’s legitimacy question is understood in the 
public discourse, especially by the elected branches. 
II.  THE RISE OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND THE COURT’S NEW 
SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY 
Scientific public opinion polls entered onto the national arena in 
the 1930s.14  After the Gallup accurately predicted President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s 1936 victory in the Presidential elections based on a 
scientific sample (refuting a magazine’s opposite prediction based on 
a non-scientific poll of more than two million mail ballots), the idea 
that a relatively small scientific sample of public opinion may accu-
rately reflect public opinion of the entire nation was established in 
the public mind.15  Gallup began conducting polls to measure public 
confidence in the Supreme Court as early as the late-1930s, yet it was 
not until the 1960s that Gallup began to track public support for the 
Court and its decisions in any systematic way.16  Several decades of 
constant polling reshaped the notion of democratic legitimacy in the 
United States.  The tendency to understand democracy in populist-
majoritarian terms has increased,17 and the term “public opinion” 
 
port for the Court . . .”); Gibson et al., supra note 6, at 354–55 (acknowledging that “un-
fortunately” the “public confidence” is the common metric). 
 14 See, e.g., SARAH E. IGO, THE AVERAGED AMERICAN SURVEYS, CITIZENS, AND THE MAKING OF A 
MASS PUBLIC 103–49 (2007) (describing the development of the techniques for creating 
the modern science of polling and their rise onto the national stage); John Durham Pe-
ters, Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE 
COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 3, 14 (Theodore L. Glasser, Charles T. Salmon eds., 1995) 
(“By the 1920s and 1930s, public opinion was reconceived as a measurable quantity that 
could be tapped by survey research.”). 
 15 JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE:  PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 77–78 
(1995). 
 16 See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 1–2, 29, 77 (2008) 
(“Until the 1930s there was no direct test by which to tell whether or not Supreme Court 
decision agreed with American public opinion.”); Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse 
nor the Sword:  Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 
1210–12 (1986) (surveying a variety of public evaluations of the Court); Roger Handberg, 
Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 1935–1981, 59 INT’L. SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 5 
(1984). 
 17 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of Rights, 
4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 291 (2002) (“We accept (to a certain extent) a ‘populist’ form 
of democracy in which all of the elected branches are understood to be directly elected 
by the people (the electoral college notwithstanding), and there is a direct role for public 
opinion in the form of polls, initiatives, and referenda.”). 
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came to be synonymous with opinion polling results.18  Since the 
1980s and the rise of the “public opinion culture,” opinion polls have 
served in the public discourse as an authoritative democratic legiti-
mator.19  In a reality riveted by persistent disagreements, an aggrega-
tive conception of democracy in which public opinion polls reveal the 
“will of the people” in a seemingly clear-cut manner has become cen-
tral to the public mind.20 
Though before the invention of public opinion polls in the 1930s, 
public support for the Court could not be reliably measured,21 long 
before the arrival of public opinion polls, the Justices of the Court al-
ready held that it “operates by its influence, by public confidence.”22  
Hence, even before the rise in authority of opinion polling, the Court 
acknowledged that its power—i.e., its ability to function properly—
depends on public opinion.  Letters from the public, random impres-
sions of public attitudes, and media coverage played a significant role 
in forming Justices’ and politicians’ views about the Court’s public 
 
 18 See SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 2 (2003) (not-
ing the recent trend toward equating public opinion with public surveys); GEORGE F. 
BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION:  FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
OPINION POLLS 6 (2005) (describing the rise in polling for public opinion in the 1930s 
and 1940s); SUSAN HERBST, NUMBERED VOICES 63 (1993) (“Scholars writing from the 
1940s to the present have been forced to contend with the notion that polls are becoming 
synonymous with public opinion.”); Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the 
Polls, 72 THE HISTORIAN 321, 323–24, 353 (2010) (“Increased legitimacy of polling made 
public opinion itself more ‘real’ and legitimate . . .”). 
 19 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75–76 (2010); IGO, 
supra note 14, at 12–13, 18–19 (showing that polls’ results serve as social facts with consid-
erable authority); Peters, supra note 14, at 14 (“[Since the 1930s,] the polling of ‘public 
opinion’ has been installed as both a symbol of democratic life and a cog in the machin-
ery of the market and the state.”). 
 20 Cf. GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 149 (2003) (“[T]he out-
come of a vote could be considered the expression of public reason or the public will.”). 
 21 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1989) (“Un-
til the mid-1930s, public opinion polling did not follow scientific, random-sampling 
methods.”). 
 22 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882) (“While by the Constitution the judicial 
department is recognized as one of the three great branches among which all the powers 
and functions of the government are distributed, it is inherently the weakest of them 
all . . . . [W]ith no patronage and no control of the purse or the sword, their power and 
influence rest solely upon the public sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal 
to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the soundness of 
their decisions and the purity of their motives.”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 618 
(1840) (“The power of this Court is moral, not physical; it operates by its influence, by 
public confidence in the soundness and uniformity of the principles on which it acts; not 
by its mere authority as a tribunal, from which there is no appeal . . . .”). 
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support.23  But until the invention of public opinion polls, Congress 
was public opinion.24  Hence, countering the will of Congress was un-
derstood as contravening the will of the majority of the public.  Thus, 
it is no wonder that before the rise of public opinion polls, according 
to a strong strand in constitutional thinking, the Court’s power was 
not dependent on public opinion, but on the executive branch.  This 
strand of thinking can be traced to The Federalist No. 78, in which Al-
exander Hamilton explained that the Court’s power “must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.”25  Contrary to the contemporary use of The Federalist No. 
78,26 according to Hamilton, the lack of “Force” or “Will” does not 
mean that the Court needs to rely on public confidence.27  The gov-
ernment’s support is acquired because the executive branch 
acknowledges the value of the Court’s judgment in a manner similar to 
a patient who recognizes a doctor’s expertise.28 
The entrance of public opinion polls as a reliable method for 
measuring the Court’s public confidence and publicly demonstrating 
the people’s confidence in the Court opened for the Court, for the 
first time in its history, a path to base its normative legitimacy on pub-
lic opinion.  In a sense, the claim that public support serves as a 
source of legitimacy for the Court’s authority is trivial in public dis-
course these days as polls on the public confidence in the Court are 
 
 23 See, e.g., JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 305 
(2010) (“[I]n 1937 there was one instant, if incomplete measure of popular opinion:  the 
telegram.  And by that benchmark, Roosevelt’s plan was, from the start, in very serious 
trouble.”). 
 24 Fried & Harris, supra note 18, at 341 (“Prior to the application of survey methods to poli-
tics (and for some time after that), members of Congress held . . . to the view that, collec-
tively, Congress was public opinion.”). 
 25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961). 
 26 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 67 (“Indeed, at least since Alexander Hamilton wrote in 
Federalist #78 that the Court is ‘possessed of neither force nor will, but merely judgment,’ 
students of American government have recognized that the Court is limited in its efficacy 
by the necessity of public and political will to give its decisions force.”); RICHARD DAVIS, 
JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS:  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN THE MEDIA AGE 19 (2011) (quot-
ing The Federalist No. 78 and then adding that “[t]he Court lacks coercive power to en-
force its decisions.  Therefore, public deference to the Court is the most powerful weap-
on in the justices’ arsenal”). 
 27 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 368–76 (“Hamilton based the Court’s power ‘merely’ on its 
judicial expertise.”). 
 28 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW:  MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICA 126 (1997) (“A judge’s knowledge of the rule of law functions analogously to a 
doctor’s knowledge of health. . . .  Power flows from knowledge . . . .”); Peters, supra note 
14, at 5 (“Even today judges and physicians render legal or medical opinions:  we are to 
understand that deciding a case or diagnosing an illness are acts of expert judgment, not 
of guaranteed truth.  To give an opinion, one must be an authority.”). 
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presented frequently in the media to justify the Court’s authority.29  
Thus, the great shift in our social imaginary became almost invisible.  
Scholars now agree that “[l]ike the executive and legislative branch-
es, the judiciary depends on public support for its legitimacy.”30  In 
the same vein, one should not discount the almost total disappear-
ance from constitutional discourse of claims that explicitly disconnect 
the Court’s legitimacy from public support for the Court.  For exam-
ple, in the 1980s, Owen Fiss argued that in a democracy, “consent is 
not granted separately to individual institutions.  It extends to the sys-
tem of governance as a whole.  Although the legitimacy of the system 
depends on the people’s consent, an institution within the system 
does not depend on popular consent.”31  Thus, the Court’s legitimacy 
depends “not on the consent—implied or otherwise—of the people, 
but rather on [its] competence, on the special contribution [it] 
make[s] to the quality of our social life.”32  Only the government as a 
whole, and not specific institutions, depends on the support of the 
people.33  Such claims are hardly prevalent in the constitutional dis-
course today.  The idea that the Court’s legitimacy is somehow de-
rived from public support for the system as a whole, and that the 
Court as an independent institution does not require enduring pub-
lic support, has almost completely disappeared from current dis-
course.34 
 
 29 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Public’s Opinion of Supreme Court Drops After Health 
Care Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A21 (reporting on a poll conducted by the New 
York Times and CBS news). 
 30 Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control:  The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opin-
ion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 379 (2006).  See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Su-
preme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword:  Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 71 (2012) 
(concluding that Hamilton “was slightly off base” in thinking that the Court has “merely 
judgment” and depends on the “executive arm,” and adding that “[t]he judiciary must ul-
timately depend on the people.  A Supreme Court that so distrusts the political pro-
cess . . . will find it hard over the long run to retain public respect”); David B. Rottman & 
Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts:  What Public Opinion Surveys Mean 
to Judges, 36 CT. REV. 24, 24 (“A court that does not have the trust or confidence of the 
public cannot expect to function for long as an effective resolver of disputes, a respected 
issuer of punishments, or a valued deliberative body.”). 
 31 Owen M. Fiss, Two Models of Adjudication, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE 
RIGHTS? 36, 43–44 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985). 
 32 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword:  The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 38 (1979). 
 33 Id. at 38 (“Legitimacy does not depend on the popular approval of the institution’s per-
formance . . . .  It is the legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends on the 
people’s approval, and that is the source of its democratic character.”). 
 34 Cf. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 221 (2002) (“[M]any commentators made the point 
that judicial power ultimately depended upon popular acceptance.”). 
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Indeed, the advent of scientific public opinion polls that measure 
public support for the Court created an important shift in the politi-
cal balance of power and, subsequently, in the Court’s understanding 
of the basis of its legitimacy.35  In the era before the invention of pub-
lic opinion polls, all the Court had was indeed “merely judgment,” as 
Hamilton proclaimed in The Federalist No. 78.36  Without a publicly ac-
cepted metric for measuring public support, the Court could not 
claim to hold public support.  Besides elections, no other source of 
data could give direct, regular, and reliable measurements of public 
opinion.37  In view of the limitations of elections to articulate political 
views,38 public attitudes toward the Court could have been deduced 
only indirectly, in a crude and inexact manner, from the rare occa-
sions when the Court was an issue in national presidential cam-
paigns.39 
As long as the elected branches were perceived to be the sole rep-
resentation of public opinion, their attacks on the Court served as the 
 
 35 Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 15, at 91–92 (arguing that the American political system was trans-
formed by a new method of assessing public attitudes, i.e. opinion polling). 
 36 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 25, at 523. 
 37 See ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 
AMERICA, 6 (2004) (“At an empirical level, there is a general agreement on one point 
among academics and professionals, be they proponents or opponents of the polling en-
terprise: opinion polls are broadly representative of popular sentiment.”); ROBERT S. 
ERIKSON, NORMAN R. LUTTBEG & KENT L. TEDIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION:   ITS 
ORIGINS, CONTENT AND IMPACT (2d ed., 1980) (“Before the advent of public opinion polls 
in the early 1930s, one had to rely on much more inexact measures of what the public was 
thinking . . . .  But the most relied upon method of assessing public opinion prior to the 
opinion poll was the interpretation of election results, and the occasional referendum 
that managed to find its way onto the ballot.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup:  Public Opinion and Constitutional 
Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 10–12 (2002) (“[T]he vote is not a particularly ar-
ticulate means of political expression. . . .  How can we tell whether the public is voting 
for the man or for his platform?”). 
 39 See STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT:  OPPOSITION 
POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER 50 (2011) (“Anti-court rhetoric is 
evident in the campaigns of 1800, 1832, 1860, 1896, 1912, 1924, 1936, 1980, 1984, 1996, 
and 2004 . . . .”); OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–
1910, at 3–5 (2006) (the Court has been a major subject in the presidential elections of 
1896 and 1912); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 177–
80 (2009) (in the Lochner period, “Judicial Review was a major issue in three presidential 
campaigns”:  the 1896, 1912, and 1924 elections); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 190 (2004) (“In the ab-
sence of polling data or other means of obtaining a more refined picture of public opin-
ion, it is difficult to gauge with any precision public sentiments on a question like judicial 
supremacy.”); MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 9–10 (2010) (“[N]o 
candidate for the presidency in modern times has been able to get the public to care 
much about whom he or his rival will appoint to the Supreme Court.”). 
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major informative signal of the Court’s waning public support.40  In 
any conflict between the Court and the political branches, the Presi-
dent and Congress could aver, based on their mandate as representa-
tives, that the public was against the Court’s policies or that, contrary 
to the Court, they enjoyed public support.41  The Court, as an une-
lected institution, could not rebut the claim of the political branches 
since, except on rare occasions, its sociological legitimacy could not 
be demonstrated through elections or any other means.  There was 
no way for the Court to rely on the tacit understanding, following 
published public opinion polls, that it enjoys public support.42  Thus, 
it could not oppose the other political branches in the public’s name.  
The elected players could always claim to hold public support, and 
there was no accepted counter-evidence except elections.43  Even if 
the Court was perceived during some historical periods as the peo-
ple’s delegate and the Justices were seen as representatives of the 
people,44 in any confrontation with the elected branches, no evidence 
 
 40 Cf. CLARK, supra note 13, at 71, 80, 255–57 (“Specifically, I have sought to demonstrate 
that congressional attacks on the Court can be interpreted as institutional signals about 
public opinion.”); Id. at 260 (“Because the Court is more insulated from the public than 
are other institutions—in particular, the Congress—the Court learns from institutional 
signals to which it can attribute meaning about public support for the judiciary.”); JEFFREY 
ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH:  HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 9 (2006) 
(“[F]or much of American history, the most reliable representative of the constitutional 
views of the American people was Congress.”). 
 41 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary:  Or, Why Courts can be More Democratic than 
Parliaments, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 25, 27 (Adam Czarnota 
et al. eds., 2005) (describing “the standard democratic story” according to which “elected 
politicians” hold a “democratic and majoritarian mandate” that courts lack). 
 42 See ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 75 (before the introduction of public opinion polls there 
was “no way of proving” public support between elections). 
 43 Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 128 (arguing that in the aftermath of the Milligan case 
and the loyalty oaths cases, members of Congress as well as of the popular press stressed 
that the structure of institutions would be destroyed if the Court, not chosen by the peo-
ple, were to become superior to Congress, which acts in the name of the people). 
 44 Many scholars claim that this was the situation during the early days of the republic, see 
ENGEL, supra note 39, at 74–77 (“Taking the Constitution to be an artifact of popular sov-
ereignty and judges as representatives of the people are cornerstones of judicial review’s 
original legitimacy.”); Id. at 84–85, 104, 282 (noting that during the Founding genera-
tion, the dominant understanding was the “judicial interpretation should accord with the 
popular will since the Constitution is, by definition, an act of popular sovereignty”); 
KRAMER, supra note 39, at 60–63 (“Courts must exercise judicial review because they are 
the people’s agents too . . . . In refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws, judges were ex-
ercising the people’s authority to resist . . . .”); id. at 80–82, 91–92 (“If judicial review was 
to occur, it would be . . . a ‘political-legal’ act, a substitute for popular resistance . . . .”); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 161 (1972) 
(“[M]ost of the early constitution-makers had little sense that judicial independence 
meant independence from the people.”); id. at 338, 448–49, 456, 460 (describing the po-
sition that in the early days of the Republic, “[t]he judges were in a sense as much agents 
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could confirm the Court’s claim of public legitimacy.  Indeed, the 
question is not only whether election returns, public representatives, 
and the media gave an accurate representation of public opinion on 
the Court before the introduction of scientific polls.  The question is 
also whether the Court’s legitimacy could be understood by the Court 
and by the other branches as based on public support without an ac-
cepted metric publicly demonstrating that support. 
A good illustration that demonstrates the patterns of thinking pri-
or to the rise of the public opinion culture can be found in the af-
termath of the Court’s 1935 decisions in the “Gold Clause” cases.45  In 
its decisions, the Court upheld the federal government’s power to re-
duce the gold content of the dollar as well as its power to nullify the 
gold clause in private contracts.  The New York Times reported relief 
within the Administration after hearing of the Court’s decision.  It al-
so told readers that based on letters sent to President Roosevelt by 
private citizens prior to the decision, President Roosevelt had “strong 
evidence that a vast aggregation of people do not think that the Su-
preme Court . . . has either the legal or moral right” to thwart the 
Administration’s decision to regulate money in that manner.46  Simi-
larly, in 1937, the flood of mail to the Court in which people ex-
pressed opposition to President Roosevelt’s plan to pack the Court 
was also considered, at that period, as reflecting public opinion.47  
But, not only letters served as a barometer for public mood; impres-
sionistic recollection also served as an indicator.  Thus, the then At-
 
of the people as the legislator . . .”); id. at 546–49, 598 (“Therefore all governmental offi-
cials, including even the executive and judicial parts of the government were agents of 
the people, not fundamentally different from the people’s nominal representatives in the 
lower houses of the legislatures.”); Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 54 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (explain-
ing that in The Federalist No. 78, “Hamilton implied . . . that the judges, though not elect-
ed, resembled the legislators and the executives in being agents or servants of the people 
with a responsibility equal to that of the other two branches of government to carry out 
the people’s will, even to the point of sharing in the making of law.”). 
 45 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. U.S., 294 U.S. 317 
(1935); Perry v. U.S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 46 See Arthur Krock, Gold Ruling Effects Weighed at Capital:  Justice Stone’s Concern Shared by Some 
Who Look to a Statutory Ban on Suing Government:  Roosevelt Radio in Reserve, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
24, 1935, at E3. 
 47 See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 13–14 (1998) (noting that for the players at that period, 
the flood of mail on the Court-packing plan served to indicate public opinion); WILLIAM 
E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 134–35 (1995) (quoting Senator Royal Copeland of New York 
who said after FDR presented his program to pack the Court, that in view of thirty thou-
sand letters and telegrams received by his office, he feels “fully informed of the wishes of 
my constituents”). 
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torney General Robert Jackson reported to the President that after 
spending time “among the plain people,” he regretted to report that 
in his opinion, “support is not increasing for your court reform but 
rather decreasing.”48 
During that period, public opinion polls had only begun their as-
cent, and members of Congress were still “confused by the polls and 
the mail and the contradictions between them.”49  In current era, 
public opinion polls are considered the authoritative indicator of 
public opinion.  Inferences based on mail are considered unreliable, 
amateurish, and unscientific.  Indeed, contrary to the prevailing atti-
tudes of the 1930s, today, politicians and Justices cannot argue that 
they are speaking for the people if public opinion polls provide con-
trary evidence.50 
The ability to track public support for the Court, the public rec-
ord of this support (often published by popular media),51 and the sci-
entific allure of opinion polls made public confidence in the Court 
more “real” in the public imagination.52  The introduction of a metric 
that measures public support for the Court, the same metric that is 
central to political players’ own understanding of their legitimacy,53 
changed the balance of power between the branches.  Now, there is 
 
 48 SHESOL, supra note 23, at 367–68 (quoting Jackson’s report to President Roosevelt and 
suggesting that President Roosevelt may have changed his views based on that report). 
 49 Id. at 331.  See also id. at 372 (“Gallup, on March 1 [1937], reported that public support 
for the plan had dropped . . . . But mail to members of Congress seemed to hint in the 
other direction.  Neither side, in short, had much to show for a month’s worth of making 
speeches.”); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION:  THE COURT PACKING FIGHT AND 
THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 184 (2009) (arguing that earlier that year, President Roose-
velt “had reason to think the public would support him.  The White House mail contin-
ued to show a thumping approval for enlarging the Court.  The scientific opinion polls, 
on the other hand, still showed a public almost evenly divided—tilting against the presi-
dent’s plan, according to Gallup’s measurements, but by no more than half a dozen per-
centage points.  The president, not yet six months beyond his landslide reelection, felt 
that he understood the American people’s wishes and needs better than any interviewer 
carrying clipboard”). 
 50 Cf. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 47, at 109 (“It might be anticipated that the emphatic out-
come of the [1936] elections would startle some Justices who had believed that they were 
speaking for a nation outraged by the New Deal.”). 
 51 During the time of the Rehnquist Court, six percent of poll questions measured trust, 
confidence, or approval of the Court as an institution (139 questions) rather than atti-
tudes toward specific decisions.  MARSHALL, supra note 16, 3–4. 
 52 See, e.g., Fried & Harris, supra note 18, at 323 (public opinion itself became more “real” 
making it a political source of legitimacy). 
 53 See Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual Sphere 2.0 in ROUTELDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNET 
POLITICS 230, 233 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard, 2009) (“Politicians, opinion 
leaders, and the media frequently rely on aggregation of public opinion obtained 
through polls.”). 
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an independent, reliable source of evidence, a public proof available 
to all, of public support for the Court. 
At least since the 1970s, this public metric has shown that public 
support for the Court as an institution is “stable and high.”54  Data al-
so show that at least since 1987, the Court has enjoyed a significant 
bedrock of diffuse support.55  The public has consistently awarded the 
Court more approval than Congress or the executive branch.56  Thus, 
the political branches may capitulate to the Court not due to its des-
ignated function as the expert interpreter of the Constitution—as if 
they were the patient doing as the doctor ordered—but due to public 
support of the Court.57  Indeed, even if the political elites lost their 
faith that the Court holds a relevant expertise for interpreting inde-
terminate constitutional norms, political resistance to its decisions 
seems infeasible as long as it holds public confidence.  Public opinion 
is the drive wheel of American politics, and no politician wants to 
stand against it.58 
Backed by survey results, the claim that the Court holds normative 
legitimacy based on public support was placed on almost the same 
empirical footing as the elected branches’ claim of normative legiti-
macy.  Besides relying on the mandate they received in the elections, 
the President and Congress base many of their legitimacy claims, in 
the intervals between elections, on the outcome of public opinion 
polls.  The Court’s inferiority in terms of democratic legitimacy was 
no longer an a priori structural premise, but an empirical question.59  
 
 54 See, e.g., Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, Dynamics of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 57 J. POL. 1114, 1118–19 (1997) (tracking public support for the Court 
from 1972 to 1994 and showing that it consistently exceeds support for the executive 
branch and Congress). 
 55 See Gibson, supra note 11, at 840–41 (summarizing six surveys between 1987 and 2008). 
 56 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 15 (“The justices regularly outpoll the Congress and often 
even the President in terms of public support or confidence.”); MARSHALL, supra note 21, 
at 138–41 (“[T]he Court has consistently won more approval than Congress or the execu-
tive branch (at least since the 1970s).”). 
 57 See Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations:  A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional 
Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346, 351–52 (2001) (“The idea is that supportive publics can 
help enforce judicial decisions via an implicit threat of a political backlash in response to 
instances of public authority defiance or delay in implementation.”). 
 58 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 81–82 (“[M]embers of Congress will generally have an inter-
est in correctly position-taking in line with public opinion, which is a central activity in 
the pursuit of reelection . . . .”); JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT:  HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN POLITICS xv–xvii (2004) (“Public opinion matters. . . .  Its 
power is that it points always to the future, telling those whose careers and strategies de-
pend on public support that success depends on being with the tide, not against it.”). 
 59 Cf. Scheppele, supra note 41, at 44–45 (claiming that at a certain period, in many ways the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court held stronger democratic legitimacy than the Hungarian 
Parliament). 
166  JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
A technological development created a new and distinct source of le-
gitimacy for the Court which is not very different from the democrat-
ic support which makes representative institutions so confident in 
their source of legitimacy. 
III.  THE CHANGE IN THE COURT’S LEGITIMATION THEORY 
Thus far, I have argued that the introduction of public opinion 
polls allowed the Court, for the first time in its history, to base its 
normative legitimacy on public support rather than solely on its ex-
pertise.  I did not argue that this change had an actual influence on 
the Court’s adjudication, nor did I claim that this source of legitimacy 
is necessarily normatively valid or suited for the Court.60  In the fol-
lowing, I argue that normatively valid or not, the Rehnquist Court 
changed its way of understanding its own normative legitimacy follow-
ing the rise of public opinion culture and the availability of this 
source of legitimacy.  While the division of the Court’s history by the 
tenure of each Chief Justice can be misleading, I argue that the com-
bination of the technological invention presented above, the rise in 
saliency of the indeterminacy of constitutional law, the decline of the 
public perception of the Court as an expert, and the lessons the 
Court derived from the Lochner and Brown cases are all responsible 
for the Rehnquist Court’s new understanding of its sources of legiti-
macy.61 
I dub the Court’s understanding of the sources of its institutional 
legitimacy:  “legitimation theory.”  A legitimation manifests itself in 
the Court’s institutional habits.  It is a conceptualization of the way 
the Court behaves in its endeavor to maintain its own legitimacy.62  A 
legitimation theory captures the Court’s institutional perspective on 
what makes judicial power legitimate.63 
 
 60 For an analysis of the normative validity of this source of legitimacy for the Court, see Bas-
sok & Dotan, supra note 2. 
 61 Cf. PIERRE BOURDIEU, ON TELEVISION 77–78 (1996) (raising the question of what would 
happen to judges if their “hypocritical” claim to “pure” expertise would be publicly dis-
proved, and it would be exposed that they are subject to the pressures of the media and 
through it, public opinion). 
 62 See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT xiv (1935) (“Institu-
tions . . . develop institutional habits, entirely separable from the personal habits of those 
who spend their working hours in their service.”). 
 63 Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the 
“Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 
196 (1997) (“If the justices believed that fidelity to original intent was an essential part of 
what made judicial power legitimate and defensible, then this interpretive tradition may 
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Legitimation theories are not permanent; indeed, the Court 
switched its legitimation theory several times over the years.64  In the 
following, I focus on one such switch and the rise of a particular legit-
imation theory, the “public confidence” legitimation theory that was 
dominant at the time of the Rehnquist Court. 
I should stress that my aim is not to analyze the thoughts of cer-
tain members of the Rehnquist Court on the issue of legitimacy.  My 
argument is not that certain Justices consciously adopted a certain le-
gitimation theory, but how the Court and other institutions be-
haved.65 
I examine the Court as an institution that has institutional habits 
just like any other multi-member institution.66  I focus on one of these 
institutional habits:  the Court’s legitimation theory. 
A.  The Decline of Legal Expertise 
Since the 1880s and up until the 1930s, legal expertise served as 
the Court’s source of legitimacy.  Most players acted under the as-
sumption that as long as the Court was true to standards of legality—
i.e., to the requirements of legal doctrine and to the original mean-
ing of constitutional provisions—both its normative and sociological 
legitimacy were secured.67  Law was understood in the public mind as 
 
be properly viewed as important component of the Court’s nineteenth-century institu-
tional perspective.”). 
 64 Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 
317 (2000) (arguing that the decision in Giles v. Harris, “provides perspective on how 
much different the Court’s proclaimed self-conception of the nature and effectiveness of 
judicial power was in the pre-Brown era”). 
 65 Cf. John McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America:  The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of So-
cial Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 489 n.10 (2002) (“In speaking about the Warren 
Court, Ely did not purport to show that Chief Justice Earl Warren or any member of the 
Court consciously conceived of their decisions in terms of Ely’s theory . . . .”). 
 66 See ARNOLD, supra note 62. 
 67 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 14–15 (1960) (“We entrusted the 
task of constitutional interpretation to the courts because we conceived of the Constitu-
tion as law, and because it is the business of courts to resolve interpretative problems aris-
ing in law.”); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:  PROFILES OF 
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES ix (3d ed. 2007) (“Judicial decisions achieved legitimacy when 
the opinions accompanying them demonstrated that judges were merely discerning finite 
and transcendent legal principles and applying them to cases.”); id. at xvi, 123 (“From 
Marshall to Harlan, judges conceived of themselves as oracles whose function was simply 
that of rendering intelligible an already existing body of legal principles.”); Gillman, su-
pra note 63, at 194 n.7 (“Prior to the twentieth century, debates about constitutional 
meaning were evaluated with reference to an accepted standards of fidelity to what was 
assumed to be the immutable meaning of the constitutional text . . . .”).  As always, there 
were certain individuals who saw beyond the horizons of the controlling social imaginary.  
Justice Holmes, arguably the first legal realist on the Supreme Court, was already aware, 
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a scientific endeavor in which the Justices held special knowledge, 
endowing their decisions with normative and sociological legitimacy 
based on legal expertise.68  As a whole, the dominant force control-
ling the Court’s work was that of expertise either in the form of doc-
trinal legality or in the form of what we would now call original-intent 
Originalism.69  Sociological and normative legitimacy were under-
stood as a corollary to legal legitimacy. 
The Butler decision, given in January 1936 during a period of high 
tension between the Court and President Roosevelt over New Deal 
reforms, contains an explicit elaboration of the Court’s legitimation 
theory.70  In Butler, the Court invalidated the first Agricultural Ad-
justment Act on the grounds that Congress lacked the power to tax 
agricultural processors in order to subsidize farmers as part of the ef-
fort to increase farms’ income.71  Speaking for a six-Justice majority, 
Justice Owen J. Roberts rejected the claim that “the court assumes a 
power to overrule or control the action of the people’s representa-
tives.” 72  He stressed, in his opinion, that “[w]hen an act of Congress 
is appropriately challenged,” all the Court does is “to lay the article of 
the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is chal-
 
before the end of the nineteenth century, of some of the changes in the Court’s com-
mitment to legal doctrine that would accompany the exposure of the indeterminacy of 
constitutional norms.  His dissent in Lochner, discussed infra in Part III.B, as well as his 
1903 opinion in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), are a good illustrations of this aware-
ness.  See Gillman, supra note 63, at 218–20 (discussing the novelty in Justice Holmes’s po-
sition regarding the role of majority opinion in constitutional decision-making); Pildes, 
supra note 64, at 306–07, 317–18 (discussing Justice Holmes’s political realism regarding 
the Court’s legitimacy in comparison to the prevailing understanding during the Lochner 
era and the Brown era). 
 68 See THOMAS GUSTAFSON, REPRESENTATIVE WORDS:  POLITICS, LITERATURE, AND THE 
AMERICAN LANGUAGE, 1776–1865, at 54–55 (1992) (“The dominant rhetoric of antebel-
lum constitutional hermeneutics represented the judge as the servant of the law who 
found the proper or correct meaning.”); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 
J.L. & POL. 239, 249 (2011) (“[T]here is ample evidence that, at least until the New Deal, 
the Court’s legitimacy in the public mind was based on the Court’s image as a legal ex-
pert.”); James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU 
L. REV. 1037, 1083 (“The postbellum Court’s pseudo-scientific jurisprudence apparently 
fooled, or at least satisfied, enough people . . . for twenty to thirty years after the Civil 
War.”). 
 69 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 92 (2011) (“Until the end of the nineteenth century, 
virtually all federal judges and justices understood themselves to be what we would now 
call originalists.”); Gillman, supra note 63, at 192 (“From the time of the founding 
throughout the nineteenth century, there was a consensus in courts opinions and legal 
treaties that judges were obligated to interpret the Constitution on the basis of the origi-
nal meaning of constitutional provisions.”). 
70  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
71  Id. at 70. 
72  Id. at 62. 
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lenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.”73  
Afterwards, the Court “announce[d] its considered judgment upon 
the question.  The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the 
power of judgment.”74  According to the majority in Butler, the Court’s 
expertise (“judgment”) not only explains the way it decides cases, but 
also the Court’s legitimacy. 
The Court’s reliance on legal expertise as the basis for its legiti-
macy does not mean that its decisions were legally correct during that 
period.  Scholars have argued that during the Lochner era, the Court’s 
understanding of the law was based on the misguided idea of Social 
Darwinism.75  For my argument, the adequacy of the Court’s under-
standing of constitutional law is immaterial.  The only relevant point 
is that the Court believed in legal expertise as the basis for its legiti-
macy. 
Although realist observations about the indeterminacy of legal 
norms had already appeared by the turn of the twentieth century,76 
only during the 1930s did indeterminacy begin to receive saliency in 
public discourse due to the clash between President Roosevelt and 
the Court over New Deal legislation.77  The discovery of wide judicial 
discretion in constitutional cases eroded the Justices’ claim to have 
professional, special legal expertise that compelled them to arrive at 
the right answer.78  Scholars agree that by the 1940s, the public un-
 
 73 Id. at 62. 
 74 Id. at 62–63. 
 75 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26–27 (1975) (arguing that the 
Justices decided cases according to the laissez-faire philosophy of Herbert Spencer, which 
was read into the Constitution); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court 
Decisions, 48 VA. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (1962) (“Natural law—the inevitability of the human 
struggle, survival of the fittest in the economic no less than in the biological world—
replaced the Constitution.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two:  Recon-
struction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 52 (2002); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE 
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 78–79 (2009). 
 77 See, e.g., Bassok, supra note 68 at 249 (“The clash between President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the Court over the New Deal reforms created a growing public awareness of the in-
herent indeterminacy of law and, consequently, of the political influences on judicial dis-
cretion.”); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937), in 
ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER:  THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928–1945, at 392 (Max Freed-
man ed., 1967) (“Now with the shift by Justice Roberts in Jones-Laughlin, overthrowing 
the Commerce Clause doctrines which the Court had used to strike down New Deal legis-
lation, even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in politics, and understand how 
the Constitution is ‘judicially’ construed.”). 
 78 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 214–15 (“The country had traveled a long way to this 
pervasive realism about the Constitution and judging. . . .  By the time of the New Deal, 
views had changed; it was widely understood that judges’ philosophies influenced consti-
tutional decisions.”); Bassok, supra note 68, at 247–53 (discussing the link between the 
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derstanding that legal expertise does not award the Court with de-
terminate answers in constitutional cases, and that the law’s mallea-
bility allows judges to decide cases based on their political prefer-
ences, was already widespread and has been spreading ever since.79  
After the New Deal era, writes Robert McCloskey,  
[I]t was no longer possible for the judges and their supporters to take 
refuge from reasoned criticism behind the old incantations—the idea 
that the Court was merely the passive mouthpiece of an unambiguous 
constitution; the idea that the nature and range of the Court’s power to 
intervene was settled once and for all by the Constitution itself or by un-
mistakable inferences from the Constitution.80 
In view of the decline in the Court’s ability to rely on legal exper-
tise as the source of its legitimacy, a search for a new source of legiti-
macy began.81  Indeed, scholars’ whole endeavor to find new justifica-
tions for the Court’s countermajoritarian authority may be viewed as 
an attempt to find a new source of expertise to preserve the Court’s 
sociological legitimacy in view of the decline of its legal expertise in 
the public mind, rather than an attempt to normatively justify its au-
thority.82  For example, some scholars attribute to the Court special 
position or knowledge that enables them to protect rights.83  Judicial 
 
rise in saliency of the indeterminacy difficulty and the decline in the belief in legal exper-
tise). 
 79 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 171–72, 223–25 (“It would be difficult to overstate 
the extent to which the public and commentators had by mid-century become reconciled 
to Realist (or anti-formalist) conceptions.”); Bassok, supra note 68, at 253 
(“[C]onstitutional theorists generally agree that the rise in public saliency of the inde-
terminacy of legal norms and the decline of the Court’s mythical image date back to the 
first half of the 20th century.”); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitu-
tionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (1993) (noting that after the New Deal, the belief 
that constitutionalism is a special expression of reason or science was undermined, and 
that constitutionalism “appeared simply as another instance of rule by political inter-
ests”). 
 80 ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 259 (5th ed., Sanford Levinson rev. 
ed. 2010) (1960).  See PERRY, supra note 10, at 140–41 (noting that among the general 
public no one believes anymore that the Court’s decisions are based on “pure law”). 
 81 See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY:  THE ROAD TO 
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 37 (2004) (arguing that due to a “breakdown of consti-
tutional consensus” during the 1940s, Justices devised various new justifications for judi-
cial review). 
 82 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 343–50. 
 83 See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword:  A Judge on Judging:  The Role of 
a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 42 (2002) (“We are experiencing a 
human rights revolution as a result of the Second World War and the Holocaust. . . . It is 
the task of the judge to protect and uphold human rights.”); Leonardo Pierdominici, 
Constitutional Adjudication and the ‘Dimensions’ of Judicial Activism:  Comparative Legal and In-
stitutional Heuristics, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 207, 219 (2013) (“Courts are uniquely 
well situated to protect rights of individuals or disadvantaged groups against an excessive-
ly powerful majority . . . .”). 
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review is thus justified as a necessary means to guarantee the protec-
tion of these rights.84  But, human rights serve not only as the basis for 
the Court’s normative legitimacy.  They also serve as a basis for the 
Court’s sociological legitimacy.  At least since the 1960s, the Court 
has come to be identified and legitimized in the public mind, at least 
partly, with the enforcement of rights-based limits on political ac-
tion.85  Similarly, according to some originalists, the Court’s counter-
majoritarian authority is normatively justified because it allows the 
Court, as an expert in constitutional history, to express the people’s 
original voice over the passing whims of public opinion.86  Yet, not 
less importantly, Originalism also “sells” in public discourse due to its 
appeal as a determinate system of interpretation and, thus, is able to 
ensure the Court’s sociological legitimacy.87  Process-based arguments 
justify judicial intervention in majoritarian decisions as means to cor-
rect failures in the democratic majoritarian process.88  Rather than at-
tributing judicial expertise in a certain substantive field, legal process 
scholars identify judges as “experts on process” and “political outsid-
 
 84 E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:  PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (2009) (“Majority rule by itself cannot be trusted to protect re-
ligious, political, racial, and geographic minorities from oppression, nor to protect fun-
damental human rights when they are needed by the powerless or the unpopular.”). 
 85 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 4–
6 (1991) (discussing the connection between rights-talk and the rise of judicial power in 
the U.S.); KECK, supra note 81, at 7, 71–72; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Rehnquist Court:  
Some More or Less Historical Comments, in THE REHNQUIST COURT:  A RETROSPECTIVE 143, 
147 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (“People look to the Courts for vindication of their 
rights; and for this reason all the arguments about ‘countermajoritarianism’ seem quite 
beside the point—politically at least.”); Martin Shapiro, The United States in THE GLOBAL 
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 43, 46–47 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995) 
(“[T]he expansion of judicial power in the United States, and perhaps even worldwide, is 
essentially associated today with the great movement toward judicial protection of human 
rights initiated, or at least dramatically signaled, by the great desegregation decision 
Brown v. Board of Education . . . .”). 
 86 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 347–348 (“Judicial review is the best mechanism for ensuring 
loyalty to the people’s original voice, since the Justices possess expertise in the field of 
constitutional history or in textualist analysis.”). 
 87 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009) (arguing that “notwith-
standing its many academic critics,” empirical evidence shows that “originalism continues 
to sell” among a large segment of the public); Bassok, supra note 68, at 266–67 (explain-
ing the adoption of originalism reasoning “as based not on its normative superiority as an 
interpretive approach but based on the Court’s concern for the sociological-legitimacy 
difficulty” and that “[o]riginalism has the appeal of making it seem that the Court is con-
strained by objective answers, derived by the expert judge from history and text, with no 
room for subjective choice or political considerations”). 
 88 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 345–46; Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy:  
John Hart Ely’s Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution’s Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
547, 552 (1981). 
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ers,” “uniquely situated to ‘impose’” process-based values.89  They also 
believe in the power of procedural legal reasoning to gain sociologi-
cal legitimacy.90 
Thus, scholars offered new formulations of judicial expertise not 
only to confront the Court’s countermajoritarian normative difficulty, 
but also to confront the concern about the erosion of enduring pub-
lic support for the Court (sociological legitimacy) in view of the de-
cline of legal expertise in the public mind.91  In other words, in order 
to explain to the public why the Court holds the ability to strike down 
legislation, a new source of judicial expertise needed to be exposed 
or devised. 
It is no wonder that in European countries such as Germany, in 
which doctrinal expertise in constitutional law is still widely acknowl-
edged both in academia and by the public,92 problems such as the 
countermajoritarian difficulty are much less pronounced.93  With le-
 
 89 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–77 & 
n.*, 88, 102, 112 (1980). 
 90 Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction:  Neutral Principles, 
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1475–77 
(2007) (“Hart and Wechsler did not insist on reason and principle because they would 
render courts more accountable, or because they were necessary to ensure fairness to liti-
gants.  They believed instead that reason and principle would endow law with legitima-
cy. . . . Professional reason appeared in their work as an unquestioned source of authority 
and legitimacy.”) 
 91 See Bassok, supra note 68, at 268–71 (discussing the relationship between the Court’s soci-
ological and normative difficulties). 
 92 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1995 (2004) 
(“Americans at bottom tend to be highly skeptical about the claims of a nonpolitical, neu-
tral constitutional law.  They are well aware that judges’ values invariably inform constitu-
tional law.  Europeans tend to have a different attitude, which is often expressed in the 
form of a more dogmatic insistence on the separateness of politics from law, including 
constitutional law.”); Armin von Bogdandy,The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism:  
A Strategy for Responding to the Challenges Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe, 7 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 364, 367–68 (2009) (“[M]ost Continental constitutional scholars conceive of 
constitutional scholarship as a science . . . .”); Id. at 391 (“Throughout Europe, legal doc-
trine is an important—if not the primary—emphasis of constitutional scholarship.”); Anke 
Grosskopf, A Supranational Case:  Comparing Sources of Support for Constitutional Courts 27 
(2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author) 
(“[I]n Europe, where the notion of judging as the ‘neutral application of the text of law’ 
is still much more widespread than in the US.”); Michaela Hailbronner, Rethinking the Rise 
of the German Constitutional Court:  Value Formalism (7.2013) (unpublished draft) (on file 
with author) (arguing that the authority of the German Constitutional Court has much 
less to do with Germany’s Nazi past than commonly assumed and more with the German 
emphasis on legal expertise). 
 93 See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:  A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 
843 (1991) (“[T]he so-called ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty,’ the term Alexander Bickel 
used to describe the root problem of judicial review in America, is not a major problem 
in Germany.”); Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review:  And Why It 
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2779 (2003) (“Americans grapple with, but never 
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gal expertise strongly rooted in the social imaginary and with a dis-
tinction between law and politics still holding firm,94 in these Europe-
an countries, the constitutional courts’ authority is still accepted in a 
manner similar to a patient who recognizes the doctor’s expertise.95  
Hence, the difference between the U.S. and European countries, 
such as Germany, is not merely a difference that stems from the fact 
that in the U.S. the authority of judicial review over federal legislation 
is not explicitly established by the Constitution while in most coun-
tries where judicial review over legislation currently exists, the author-
ity of judicial review is explicitly anchored in the Constitution.96  It is a 
difference that stems also from the difference in how Americans and 
Europeans imagine expertise in general and legal expertise in partic-
ular.97  The way people imagine expertise in different cultures is a 
 
finally resolve, the ‘countermajoritarian’ problem . . . .  European academics and consti-
tutional judges will state as much in one breath, and then move on to more interesting is-
sues.”). 
 94 See, e.g., GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 12 
(2005) (“Especially among European (legal) scholars, courts are still often assumed to be 
‘above politics,’ and their decisions tend to be treated as purely legal texts that can be 
understood in isolation from their political context.”); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution:  
The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 525 (1994) (dis-
cussing the European tradition’s tendency to view the judicial process above and outside 
politics); Grosskopf, supra note 92, at 71 (“[G]eneral trend in German (as in most of con-
tinental Europe) to view courts as fundamentally non-political actors.”). 
 95 See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review in Central and Eastern Europe:  Rationales or Ra-
tionalizations?, 42 ISR. L. REV. 500, 516–519 (2009) (“[In central and Eastern Europe,] the 
rationale that carried the most weight . . . certainly in the self-legitimation produced by 
constitutional judges themselves—was a rather simple-minded view that constitutional 
judges have a privileged insight into the true, ‘objective’ meaning of constitutional 
rights . . . .”) (Isr.). 
 96 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS:  A STORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE xiii (2005) (“[T]he power of 
constitutional adjudication, in its abstract form is explicitly contained in the constitution-
al texts of European states, rather than only being recognized as implicit therein by the 
doctrine developed by the court itself, as was the case in the United States.”); Barak, supra 
note 83, at 128 (“Since the end of World War II, most new constitutions have included 
express provisions about judicial review, thereby ending the legal debate over its legitima-
cy.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Clark A. Miller, Civic Epistemologies:  Constituting Knowledge and Order in Political 
Communities, 2 SOC. COMPASS 1896, 1903–04 (2008) (“While science is often mobilized by 
competing parties in political disputes in the United States . . . this occurs much less fre-
quently in Europe.  This has been constantly apparent in the debate about climate 
change, where European countries have been subjected to far fewer debates than the 
United States over the scientific basis of climate change.  Indeed, in Germany, when in-
dustry groups sought to reject the reality of climate change, they were forced to import 
US critics of climate science, as no German scientist would become involved.”). 
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“mere” social construct, but it attains the character of objective reality 
for legal reasoning and thinking.98 
The use of the proportionality doctrine is merely one manifesta-
tion of the difference in the way Europeans and Americans imagine 
legal expertise and the distinction between law and politics.  In Ger-
many, proportionality is the most dominant doctrine in constitutional 
adjudication and is conceived of as a doctrine of expertise—part of 
the judicial expert “tool-kit”—that offers answers to constitutional 
controversies.99  In the United States, it is considered too indetermi-
nate and fluid to offer any clear answers, and thus it is almost never 
used.100  In Germany, it is imagined as a politically neutral tool, while 
in the United States, it is imagined as a conduit to insert the Justices’ 
political agenda.101  Thus, the seeming paradox of an American con-
stitutional discourse that is saturated with legal realist insights, and 
yet is characterized by categorical doctrines, is dissolved.102  American 
courts prefer categories that are perceived as more determinate, such 
as strict scrutiny, in view of the decline of their expertise in public 
 
 98 See PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY:  ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF 
RELIGION 9 (1967) (discussing a “humanly produced world [that] attains the character of 
objective reality”); TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 50 (explaining the idea of the social imaginary 
as “the way we collectively imagine, even pretheoretically, our social life”); Weiler, supra 
note 94, at 525 (“The belief in the apolitical and neutral nature of the judicial process is, 
in fact, the reality that counts.”). 
 99 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller:  The Propor-
tionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367, 393 (2009) 
(“[R]ather than being perceived as illegitimate judicial intervention in policymaking, bal-
ancing is viewed in Germany, and elsewhere on the Continent, as the objective, systemat-
ic, and logical implementation of constitutional rights, while realizing values in everyday 
life is considered to be the quintessential task of the court.”); id. at 404 (“[D]espite its 
lofty and abstract goals, proportionality is the product of a legal frame of mind that is far 
more formalistic than the American one.”). 
100 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptional-
ism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 424 (2008) (“U.S. courts . . . reject the near-universal propor-
tionality test in favor of the more categorical, rule-like, fixed tiers or standards of re-
view.”); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion?  American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799 (2011) (“In contrast to the United 
States, constitutional courts in legal systems around the world have converged on a meth-
od for adjudicating rights claims—proportionality analysis . . . .”). 
101 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality:  The 
Historical Origins, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 263, 286 (2010) (noting that in the U.S., balancing 
is viewed as “allowing judges far too much discretion,” while in Germany, proportionality 
“does not raise as much suspicion . . . [and] has gained the status of a central and non-
controversial doctrine”); Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 100, at 807 (arguing that 
outside the U.S., the proportionality doctrine “bestows a sheen of politico-ideological 
neutrality on a court, across time and circumstances”). 
102 See Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 101 at 264–65 (observing the paradox of describing 
the American system, “the birthplace of antiformalism,” as a system committed to categor-
ical thinking). 
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discourse.103  Even if proportionality will one day take hold in the 
United States, it will not be understood in the same manner as it is 
understood in Europe.  Even if all of its internal doctrinal compo-
nents will be identical to its German counterpart, it will still be con-
sidered as much more political and indeterminate.104 
It is thus important to stress that the rise of public opinion polls 
does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of the notion of legit-
imacy based on expertise.  Even with the rise to dominance of the 
idea that the Court has to have enduring public support, as demon-
strated in opinion polls, to function properly, the Court does not 
have to consider public opinion in order to preserve its public confi-
dence.  As long as the public awards the Court enduring support 
based on its belief in expertise (legal or other kind of expertise), the 
Court’s expertise-based legitimation theory can remain intact.105  Yet, 
due to the current dominance of the idea that the Court’s power de-
pends on enduring public support, the Court’s legitimation theory 
must prove viable in opinion polls.  If public opinion polls show a de-
cline in public confidence in the Court, the Court may have to switch 
its legitimation theory in order to preserve its public stand.  Hence, 
the decline of the Court’s image as legal expert made the Court 
search for a new legitimation theory necessary.  But, in order to un-
derstand the rise of the public confidence legitimation theory, one 
needs to look beyond the background conditions to lessons the 
Rehnquist Court learned from Lochner and Brown. 
B.  The Lochner Decisional Line 
The Court’s adjudication during the period between 1869 and 
1932 is presented, at least according to the current dominant profes-
sional legal narrative, as a dark age in which the Court was legally 
mistaken.  According to this description, the New Deal reforms com-
 
103 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 59-60 (1992) (“The Court ties itself to the twin masts of 
strict scrutiny and rationality review in order to resist (or appear to resist) the siren song 
of the sliding scale.  Bipolar two-tier review did penance for the appearance of naked val-
ue choices that had brought the Court into disrepute in the Lochner era.”). 
104 Cf. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION:  FIN DE SIÈCLE 92 (1997) (“Continen-
tal legal theory is uncannily ‘other’ for an American, perhaps because just about every-
thing in our legal culture is present in theirs, often translated word by word, but nothing 
seems to have the same meaning.”). 
105 See Bassok, supra note 68, at 251 (“The notion of legal expertise is a historical and social 
construct.  Its place in the social imagination depends by and large on the trust society is 
willing to extend to claims of independent legal expertise.”). 
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pelled the Court to rediscover the true Constitution.106  In recent dec-
ades, revisionist constitutional historians argue that in view of the 
available legal materials of that period, it is hard to see how the Jus-
tices could have decided differently.107  In any event, according to 
both of these historical narratives, for the legal community at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, the decisional line of Lochner and 
Adkins was considered legal.108 
The crisis surrounding President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan 
involved, perhaps for the first time, politicians guided by public opin-
ion polls.109  But, not only politicians became aware of this new tool.  
The Court had also “been baptized ‘in the waters of public opin-
ion.’”110 
A sharp controversy still exists on the question of whether the 
Court’s “switch in time” was caused by political pressure from outside 
the Court or whether it was the manifestation of deeper doctrinal 
shifts that had been taking place in the Court’s adjudication for some 
time before the switch.111  Scholars that support the former approach 
 
106 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 62–67 (1991) (presenting 
the “myth of rediscovery,” claiming that “modern judges do resist the very suggestion that 
Lochner might have been a legally plausible decision in 1905 . . .”); id. at 100–01 (the myth 
portrays “the Lochner Court as if it were abusing the idea of constitutional interpretation 
by imposing its idiosyncratic and reactionary views on a polity yearning for the New 
Deal”); CUSHMAN, supra note 47, at 3–4 (describing the “conventional wisdom” and argu-
ing that “it certainly has been overstated, and that it may well be just plain wrong”). 
107 See, e.g., 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE supra note 106, at 100–03 (concluding that it is 
hard to see how the Lochner Court could have decided otherwise); FRIEDMAN, supra note 
39, at 188 (“Modern-day revisionists have done a great service in correcting the sometime 
impression that judges during the Lochner era were simply making the law up as they went 
along.  Rather, there were established legal principles, like the prohibition on ‘class legis-
lation,’ upon which judges relied when invalidating progressive measures.”) 
108 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 177 (2011) (“In 1910 many mainstream lawyers and legal scholars would have 
doubted that either Lochner or Plessy was wrong, much less wrong the day they were decid-
ed.”); see also id. at 189–90, 203 (“Given existing constitutional understandings and politi-
cal forces at play, the result in Lochner was certainly within the range of possible decisions.  
It may have been wrong, but it was certainly not implausible.”). 
109 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:  Law’s Politics, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 982 (2000) (“Popular opinion shifted in response to political 
events, and political tides shifted quickly with popular opinion—perhaps the first demon-
stration of a phenomenon of politicians driven by polls and public opinion that has be-
come so prominent today.”). 
110 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 47, at 143. 
111 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 290–92 (1998) (describ-
ing the controversy and offering a middle ground); CUSHMAN, supra note 47, at 11–23 
(arguing that it is “unlikely” that the Court’s 1937 shift was a response to the Court-
packing plan rather than a result of “internal” doctrinal development); Friedman, supra 
note 109, at 1054 (“Scholars differ greatly on the question whether political pressure 
could account for the Court’s switch.”); Laura Kalman, AHR Forum:  The Constitution, the 
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point to the threat posed by President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan 
or the pressure created by public support for New Deal policies as the 
two vivid manifestations of external pressures.112  Gregory Caldeira 
shows that during the four months in 1937 when President Roosevelt 
was trying to pack the Court, an “intimate connection” existed be-
tween “the actions taken by the Court and the justices” and support 
for the Supreme Court as reflected by public opinion polls.113 
While the controversy over the causes for the Court’s “switch in 
time” may remain forever unresolved, one can hardly question that 
public opposition to tinkering with the Court after the switch, as re-
flected in opinion polls,114 was a major reason for the failure of Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s plan.115  The failure of the Court-packing plan taught 
all players a valuable lesson on the potential of public opinion.  It 
demonstrated that the combination of public support for the Court 
(and not necessarily its decisions), as expressed in opinion polls, to-
gether with the mass media’s support,116 is a powerful weapon inde-
 
Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052, 1054–55 (2005) (describing the 
disagreement over the reasons for the Court’s changing position). 
112 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 167 (showing that “following the major confrontation in 
1937, the Court retreated and used its power of judicial review at the lowest level since 
the nineteenth century”).  See also id. at 198–99 (noting that externalist historical ac-
counts attribute “a causal role to the Court-packing plan . . . and the elections of 
1936 . . . in explaining the Court’s decisions”); Kalman, supra note 111, at 1054 (“[T]he 
Court’s behavior seemed calculated to undermine that support, since it became harder 
for FDR to claim that he needed additional justices to protect his program.”). 
113 Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court:  FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 
81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1139, 1139, 1149–50 (1987). 
114 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 197 (“[F]rom the beginning, the proposal [to pack the 
Court] did not garner even a bare majority of public support.”); BARBARA A. PERRY, THE 
PRIESTLY TRIBE:  THE SUPREME COURT’S IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 19–20 (1999) (“De-
spite his electoral popularity, President Roosevelt never commanded the allegiance of a 
majority of Americans in struggle against the Supreme Court.”); Cushman, supra note 38 
at 67–74 (surveying public polls demonstrating that by and large, the public did not sup-
port Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan). 
115 See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS:  POSITIVIST THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 126 
(2009) (“We believe Franklin Roosevelt’s failure in his constitutional scheme in the 1930s 
was in part due to the institutional legitimacy the Supreme Court enjoyed among the 
American mass public.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics:  The Positive Puzzle of 
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 737 (2011) (“Although an obstructionist 
Court was ultimately brought into line with the views of the dominant national political 
coalition, the political unpopularity of Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan seemed to reveal a 
significant measure of support for an independent judiciary.”). 
116 CUSHMAN, supra note 47, at 13 (arguing that “[f]rom the beginning, the press voiced 
near-unanimous out-rage and disdain to the program to pack the Court” and that polls 
taken between February and May of 1937 indicate that this initiative “was consistently op-
posed by a majority of the same American people who had so overwhelmingly returned 
him to office”).  See also SHESOL, supra note 23, at 245–46 (“Though nearly 60 percent of 
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pendent of the power of government.117  Indeed, the 1937 experience 
demonstrated how entrenched judicial independence and judicial 
review have become in the American public mind.118  Barry Friedman 
writes of a “tacit deal” formed as a result of the New Deal, according 
to which “the American people would grant the Justices their power, 
so long as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution did 
not stray too far from what the majority of the people believed it 
should.”119 
But, as I show below, the lesson that the Rehnquist Court learned 
from this episode has another side:  public legitimacy may compel the 
Court to overturn constitutional decisions which it believes are legally 
correct.  Without public legitimacy, a constitutional interpretation 
that is considered legal will become unlawful.  Hence, legality, i.e., 
 
the public wanted the Court to take a ‘more liberal’ view of the New Deal, this did not 
equal a desire to curb the Court:  only 41 percent favored limits on judicial review.”); id. 
at 301–02 (“A survey taken at the time showed that more than two thirds of the newspa-
pers that had backed Roosevelt’s re-election in 1936 now opposed him on the Court bill, 
and more than half of these did so ‘vigorously.’”); Friedman, supra note 109, at 1049 
(“Gallup polls . . . showed both dissatisfaction with Court decisions and opposition to 
tinkering with the Court.”). 
117 See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a ‘Majoritarian’ Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 
103, 132 (“[M]ore remarkable, here was the most popular president in history, with a 
Congress his party controlled overwhelmingly, confronted by the most aggressive Court 
in American history—and yet, it is entirely plausible that FDR’s legislative challenge to 
the authority of the Court would have failed, given how deep the cultural and political 
support was for the Court’s institutional authority, even as the Court issued one unpopu-
lar decision after another.”). 
118 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 268 
(2007) (“The public and political opposition to the Court-packing plan demonstrated the 
substantial authority the Court still possessed, even among those who disagreed with 
many of its substantive decisions.  The authority of the Court to interpret the Constitu-
tion and guard it against political violation, an authority that conservative political leaders 
had been building in the public mind for several decades, bore its ultimate fruit.”).  See 
also, Pildes, supra note 117, at 132 (“[O]ne can read the 1937 experience as suggesting 
that, for better or worse, judicial independence and the authority of the Court have be-
come so entrenched in America that even the most popular politicians play with fire if 
they seek too directly to take on the power of the Court.”). 
119 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 4.  Friedman also claims that, 
The true significance of 1937 requires no hidden clues; it was plain for all to see.  
The American people signaled their acceptance of judicial review as the proper 
way to alter the meaning of the Constitution, but only as long as the justices’ deci-
sions remained within the mainstream of popular understanding. 
  Id. at 196.  As a result, 
The 1937 fight over the Court ushered in the modern era of judicial review and 
American constitutionalism:  judicial review now was widely valued, but only so 
long as important judicial decisions did not wander far from the mainstream of 
American belief about the meaning of the constitution. 
  Id. at 236. 
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expert doctrinal reasoning, is not enough.120  Justice Holmes’s dissent 
in Lochner presents this lesson very vividly by advising against autono-
mous doctrinal thinking that isolates the Court from public opin-
ion.121  Jack Balkin succinctly summarized this lesson by noting that 
“[t]o respond to changes in the national political process, courts may 
have to discard a substantial proportion of existing doctrine.”122  
While this lesson became apparent only with the “switch in time” in 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, Lochner became the symbol of the era.123  
For that reason, I entitle this lesson “the Lochner lesson.” 
C.  Brown and Its Progeny 
For the legal community during the 1950s, it was extremely hard 
to justify Brown124 in terms of legality.125  At that period, the scholarly 
consensus was that the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
 
120 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:  The Lesson of 
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (2001) (“The important lesson of this era is that 
the legitimacy of law and the independence of judges require a certain basic acceptance 
of judicial decisions.”).  See also, TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL 
COURT 182 (1999) (“[A]s the New Deal episode and public opinion research demon-
strates, public opinion is determined by the political acceptability of its decisions rather 
than the presence of persuasive constitutional authority for the Court’s intervention and 
its subsequent decisions.”). 
121 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that the 
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the 
natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man 
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles 
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”); see also Wil-
son, supra note 68, at 1098 (“The Lochner majority did not only err because they constitu-
tionalized their own economic ideology.  They also ignored the public’s views . . . .”). 
122 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM supra note 69, at 307–08 (extracting this lesson from West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish). 
123 See 2 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 111, at 257 (noting, while discussing the New 
Deal constitutional moment, that “Lochner v. New York serves as the paradigm”).  Balkin 
notes that “‘Lochner’ is not just the decision in Lochner v. New York, but an accompanying 
story about the place of the decision in the history of the Constitution, the Court, and the 
country.”  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 69, at 192.  
[Rather,] Lochner v. New York came to symbolize an entire period of jurisprudence, 
called the ‘Lochner era.’  It ran from 1897, when the Court first began to strike 
down state laws for violating a constitutional liberty of contracts, to 1937 when the 
Supreme Court upheld a minimum wage law for women workers in the famous 
case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. 
  Id. at 176. 
124 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
125 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:  THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 258 (1992) (“Brown v. Board of Education produced a sharply criti-
cal reaction among elite legal thinkers, for it challenged at the deepest levels their efforts 
to re-establish a neutral, value-free system of constitutional doctrine.” (footnote omit-
ted)); KECK, supra note 81, at 55–58 (describing scholarly critique of Brown). 
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Amendment did not support the assertion that school segregation 
was unconstitutional.  It is unsurprising then that in his research 
memo in Brown, Alexander Bickel, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s clerk at 
that time, directed the Justices away from a historical-based argu-
ment.126  The Court thus explicitly stated that the historical sources 
for the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment were “not enough to 
resolve the problem with which we are faced.  At best, they are incon-
clusive.”127  Since there were no precedents to support its position, the 
Court relied on the authority of social science, stating that this “mod-
ern authority” had now demonstrated that segregated education 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to [black children’s] status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to 
ever be undone.”128  The Court’s reliance on the work of Swedish so-
cial scientists, Gunnar Myrdal among others, made William 
Rehnquist, then Justice Robert H. Jackson’s clerk, echo in his memo-
randum in the case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in 
Lochner.  Rehnquist wrote that “[i]f the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not enact Spencer’s Social Statics, it just as surely did not enact 
Myrdal’s [sic] American Dilemma.”129 
One can plausibly argue that at the time it was handed down, 
Brown was illegal.  In this spirit, Herbert Wechsler famously criticized 
Brown as wrongly decided.130  Over the years, many scholars agreed 
that the decision lacked legal legitimacy.131 
 
126 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 7, 56–58 (1955) (framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to pro-
hibit segregated public schools).  See also BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 69, at 
105 (“[At that time], most people accepted Alexander Bickel’s conclusion that the fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit segregated public 
schools.”); Alferd H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:  An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 
145 n.101 (discussing Bickel’s memo). 
127 Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.  See also, KECK, supra note 81, at 48–52 (discussing the process 
leading the Court to reject the historical sources). 
128 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
129 Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 246 (1988) (quoting Rehnquist) (footnote omitted). 
130 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 
(1959).  See Louis Michael Seidman, What’s So Bad About Bush v. Gore?  An Essay on Our 
Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953, 1011 (2001) (“At least Justice Jackson and proba-
bly Justice Frankfurter believed that Brown was indefensible as a matter of constitutional 
law, but voted for the result anyway because of their strong belief that an end to legally 
enforced segregation was a political and moral imperative.”) 
131 See, e.g., 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 106, at 144; ELY, supra note 89, at 54–55; 
ENGEL, supra note 39, at 288–89 (“For all [Brown’s] moral correctness, the Court did not 
offer much by way of legal arguments against desegregation.”); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 55 (1958) (“I have never been able to understand on what basis [Brown] does 
or can rest except as a coup de main.”); HORWITZ, supra note 125, at 340 n.71 (“One is 
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As for sociological legitimacy, at the time it was given, Brown may 
have been a countermajoritarian decision in the sense that, according 
to public opinion polls, the majority of the public did not support the 
decision.132  Yet, even if Brown was a countermajoritarian decision at 
that time, “[i]n the half century since the Supreme Court’s decision 
Brown has become a beloved legal and political icon . . . it is the single 
most honored opinion in the Supreme Court’s corpus.”133  Balkin 
adds that it is “the most central symbol of the legitimate exercise of 
judicial review.”134  In the same vein, Richard Fallon writes that Brown 
is viewed as a paradigm of appropriate Supreme Court decision mak-
ing.135  Today, “[i]n nearly all eyes,” Fallon adds, “Brown reflects the 
Supreme Court at its best.”136  Indeed, as Pamela Karlan notes, “[f]ifty 
years on, Brown has become a primary source of sustained public 
confidence in the Court . . . .”137   
Though Brown’s main rationale was based on social facts that re-
stricted the decision to primary and secondary public education 
 
surprised to learn how late it was that legal academics actually sought to defend the Brown 
decision.”); LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 40 (2000) (“A 
lawyer reading Brown was sure to ask, ‘where’s the law?’”); TAMANAHA, supra note 76, at 
84–86 (“[T]he Brown decision has always been dubious from a legal standpoint.”); Jack M. 
Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:  THE 
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 4 
(J.M. Balkin ed., 2001) (“Even many defenders of the result had little good to say about 
the opinion, arguing that its overruling of previous precedents was abrupt and unex-
plained . . .”); Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory:  Reflec-
tions on Ackerman, Reconstruction and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 
YALE L.J. 2012, 2014 (1999) (noting that the Brown Court’s “approach has failed to per-
suade many legal analysts, who generally approve of the decision, that Brown advances a 
‘neutral principle’—that is, a principle that can transcend time”).  Contra PHILIP B. 
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT xvi (1970) (“The School 
Desegregation Cases . . . were in the making for a decade before the opinion was ren-
dered.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 85–92 (2010) (arguing that Brown 
can be justified “solidly” on the basis of the common law method as many precedents led 
to it). 
132 See Pildes, supra note 117, at 120–22 (surveying the controversy between scholars who 
claim that Brown was a majoritarian decision and those who claim that it was a counterma-
joritarian decision). 
133 Balkin, supra note 131, at 9 (“Brown became recognized as a symbol, not only of racial 
equality, but of equality and equal opportunity generally.”).  See also, 1 ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE, supra note 106, at 137 (“Brown came to possess the kind of numinous legal 
authority that is, I believe, uniquely associated with legal documents that express the con-
sidered judgment of We the People.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION 56 (2001) (“In both legal consciousness and the popular imagination, 
Brown v. Board of Education exemplifies constitutional justice.”). 
134 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 108, at 209. 
135 FALLON, supra note 133, at 58. 
136 FALLON, supra note 133, at 58. 
137 Karlan, supra note 30, at 8. 
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(without even directly overturning Plessy), the Court soon issued or-
ders, based on its decision in Brown, making segregation unconstitu-
tional in cases where this rationale did not apply.138  This series of per 
curiam decisions striking down segregation in a wide range of nonac-
ademic public facilities, such as beaches and public golf courses 
could not be reasoned, at that time, in terms of legality as emanating 
from Brown.139  Several constitutional scholars view these decisions as 
nothing but pure fiat.140  Yet, sociological legitimacy made these deci-
sions part of the now-unimpeachable decisional line beginning with 
Brown.  As the years passed, courts explicitly declared that they would 
follow Brown’s public symbolic meaning.141 
After a while, Brown’s public meaning became the legal baseline, 
and when the Court strayed from this baseline, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall could complain that the decision not to compel suburban 
school districts to integrate with racially segregated urban districts “is 
 
138 See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 
1541 (2004) (“In Brown itself, the Supreme Court did little more than announce that 
‘separate but equal’ was unconstitutional as applied to elementary and secondary educa-
tion . . . .”). As a result, 
At first it was quite unclear what the decision meant.  Rather than directly overrul-
ing Plessy, the Court merely stated that Plessy had no application ‘in the field of 
public education.’. . . [T]he meaning of Brown shifted to accommodate a shifting 
political center . . . fifty years of social contestation have produced the Brown we 
know today. 
  Id. at 1564–68.  See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 76 (1990) (describ-
ing how the Court ruled, based on Brown, that segregated beaches, golf courses, parks, 
and courtrooms were unconstitutional).  
139 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle 
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); 
Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). 
140 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miran-
da v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (2010) (“The series of per curiam decisions striking 
down segregation in other contexts were nothing but pure fiat, a point made repeatedly 
in their wake.”). 
141 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 106, at 137 (“[T]oday’s judiciary treats Brown as 
a decisive constitutional authority possessing infinitely greater weight than it did in the 
1950’s when the Brown Court cautiously announced its intention to proceed ‘with all de-
liberate speed.’”); BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 108, at 140 (“Later 
on, people attributed elements of the theory of citizenship that developed during the 
1960s and 1970s to Brown.  In hindsight, Brown has come to represent this second theory 
of citizenship, even though that theory was not yet articulated in 1954 and would not be 
fully articulated for many years.”); BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 69, at 312 
(“Brown v. Board of Education has been continuously reinterpreted since it was first handed 
down, and there is a strong argument that it has been significantly modified, if not wholly 
transformed, by later decisions.”); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat:  On Integration and Legiti-
mation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 715–16 (2007) (analyzing the meaning given to Brown 
in McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (W.D. Ky. 
2004) and in Parents Involved in Community. Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 
S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007)). 
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more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far 
enough in enforcing the Constitution’s guarantee of equal justice 
than it is the product of neutral principles of law.”142 
The lesson of Brown is that sociological legitimacy can be acquired 
regardless of legal legitimacy.143  As years go by, fractures in legality 
can be healed by strong public support.144  Thus, today, as David 
Strauss writes, “[t]he lawfulness of Brown is the fixed point for the 
mainstream legal culture.”145 
D.  Imagining the Past 
In essence, Alexander Bickel depicted the Warren Court during 
the 1960s as understanding its legitimacy as based on the idea of a 
“bet on the future.”146  While Bickel did not formulate his claim in 
terms of a “legitimation theory,” his picture of the Warren Court sug-
gested that the Justices no longer understood their legitimacy as 
stemming from legal doctrinal expertise.  Instead, the Court “bet on 
the future,” relying on vindication of its egalitarian vision by future 
events, more than on reasoned argument, to achieve both normative 
and sociological legitimacy.147  The Justices believed that adhering to 
the goal of progress toward an egalitarian society would ensure the 
 
142 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
143 See EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT:  PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, 
AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 72 (2004) (arguing that persuading the legal community was a 
minor issue in Brown since Chief Justice Warren understood that it is the lay public “who 
decide whether the opinion is legitimate, and this particular decision had to be legitimate 
in order to be successful”); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 280–81 (2008) (not-
ing that Brown “is the unusual constitutional case in which everyone agrees to waive legal-
ist objections by observing that, yes, it was decided on political grounds, but they were 
good grounds and it would be pedantic to demand more”).  Bork notes additionally that 
Scholars used to worry that the Court would damage its authority if it acted politi-
cally. . . .  The fact is quite the contrary.  The Court is virtually invulnerable, and 
Brown proved it.  The Court can do what it wishes, and there is almost no way to 
stop it, provided its result has a significant political constituency. . . .  Much of the 
rest of the Warren’s Court’s history may be explained by the lesson it learned from 
its success in Brown. 
  BORK, supra note 138, at 77. 
144 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1789–90 (2007); Mi-
chael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 
1721, 1722–23 (2001). 
145 STRAUSS, supra note 131, at 78. 
146 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13 (1970). 
147 Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword:  The New Constitutional Order 
and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 84 (1999) (noting that 
the Warren Court’s egalitarian vision as its source of normative legitimacy rose during the 
mid-1960s, as “the ‘footnote 4’ jurisprudence no longer provided sufficient authority for 
the Court’s programmatic liberalism.  Instead the Court began to move in the direction 
of taking the regime’s programmatic liberalism as a constitutional mandate”). 
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Court’s legitimacy in the long run, even if they deviated from the 
standards of legality in the short run.148  Bickel explained that “[i]f 
the bet pays off, whatever their analytical failings . . . it isn’t going to 
matter that . . . [the Court’s] reasoning is . . . faulty.”149  The future 
public would just be grateful to the Court for a more just society and 
forget the faulty legal reasoning. 
In terms of legitimation theories, the Rehnquist Court is a direct 
progeny of the Warren Court.  The way the Rehnquist Court “imag-
ined the past and remembered the future”150 offers the best way to de-
tect its legitimation theory.  The way a Court narrates its past is hardly 
the only possible way.  Legal scholars offer various narratives for the 
Court’s stream of decisions.  Thus, a Court’s choice of a certain story-
line reflects not only on past Courts but mostly on the imagining 
Court.151 
As Morton Horwitz notes, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,152 the Rehnquist Court posited 
“two . . . decisional lines from the past century,” culminating with 
Lochner and Brown, as the “twin peaks of modern constitutional law.”153  
The plurality opinion concluded that a judgment must have legal le-
gitimacy, otherwise it “would be no judicial act at all.”154  Yet, the “re-
pudiation of Adkins by West Coast Hotel and Plessy by Brown” is ex-
plained in terms of sociological legitimacy.155 
This understanding of these two decisional lines corresponds well 
with the lessons of Lochner and Brown as presented above.  The cumu-
 
148 BICKEL, supra note 146, at 12–14; BICKEL, supra note 75, at 27–28.  See also, LAURA 
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 46 (1996) (“Some Warren Court 
opinions did make no pretense of suggesting law and legal theory compelled the justices 
to reach their decision. . . .  One popular quip described the apparent thought of the 
Warren Court majority:  ‘With five votes, we can do anything.’”); KURLAND, supra note 
131, at xxii (“The Court’s opinions have tended toward fiat rather than reason.”).  See also 
id., at 37–38 (discussing the Warren Court’s “reluctance to be guided by precedent in 
constitutional cases”). 
149 BICKEL, supra note 146, at 99. 
150 Id. at 13 (citing Namier). 
151 Cf. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 108, at 220 (“If Bush v. Gore be-
comes characteristic of the legal culture of the late twentieth century, it will be because 
the future remembers selectively and perpetually remakes the past in its own image.”). 
152 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming by a vote of 5-4 
the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade,” that abortions prior to fetal viability may not be 
criminalized). 
153 Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword:  The Constitution of Change:  
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 38, 71 (1993). 
154 Casey, 505 U.S. at 865. 
155 Id. at 864–65. 
Oct. 2013] NEW SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY 185 
 
lative understanding rising from the way the Court in Casey imagined 








LOCHNER + - REPUDIATED 
BROWN - + CONSOLIDATED 
 
The combined lesson of Lochner and Brown taught the Court that 
in visible cases, legal legitimacy is less important than sociological le-
gitimacy.  On the one hand, decisions which the Court perceives as 
having a solid legal basis can still lack sociological legitimacy.  The 
doctrinal merits of a legal position are hardly a guarantee of public 
support.156  Fierce political attacks against these decisions and hostile 
public opinion may, in the end, compel the Court to switch its legal 
position, even if it is doctrinally well-established.  Thus, eventually, 
the Court may deprive these legal decisions of their legal legitima-
cy.157  On the other hand, an illegal decision can become sociological-
ly legitimate, and in the end legal, with enough public support.158 
Following this imagining of the past, the plurality opinion con-
cludes that 
A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circum-
stances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both pro-
 
156 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 363–66 (“[P]rincipled arguments that are persuasive in legal 
terms are not necessarily persuasive in the public discourse.”); Friedman, supra note 120, 
at 1387 (“The public rarely knows, and undoubtedly little cares, if there is a preexisting 
doctrinal basis for judicial decisions.”). 
157 The “Lesson of Lochner,” as Friedman explains, is  
whether or not judicial decisions have a jurisprudential basis, if they lack social le-
gitimacy, judges will be attacked as acting unlawfully. . . . Social legitimacy is not 
separate from legal legitimacy, but can spill back upon it.  When feelings of social 
illegitimacy are strong enough, the claim easily may be made that the judges are 
acting illegitimately in a legal sense. 
   Friedman, supra note 120, at 1447–48, 1452–54. 
158 See Klarman, supra note 144, at 1722–23.  This was the destiny, not only of Brown, but also 
of the “switch in time” judgments.  At the time of the “switch in time,” the overwhelming 
majority of the legal profession was stunned by the change in interpretation.  From a le-
galistic point of view, “the switch in time” judgments were illegal, creating a rupture in le-
gality that was bridged by sociological legitimacy.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 231–32, 
234, 236 (“The Constitution changed dramatically” without a constitutional amendment.  
“Yet there was absolutely no furor about this method of constitutional change at the time.  
This change too was plainly ‘political’ but it apparently was the sort of constitutional 
change with which the country was comfortable”). 
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found and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Na-
tion’s commitment to the rule of law.  It is therefore imperative to ad-
here to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.159 
Roe’s serious problems on the level of legality were not decisive.160  
As the Court saw it, in the end, all boils down to sociological legitima-
cy, and more precisely to the effect on the sociological legitimacy of 
the Court:  “[O]verruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach 
an unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis, but would seri-
ously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and 
to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of 
law.”161  In essence, the joint opinion justified preserving the essential 
holding of Roe v. Wade in order to avoid another self-inflicted wound 
to the institutional legitimacy of the Court.162  Casey thus included an 
explicit and rare admission that public opinion on the substantive is-
sue as well as public confidence in the Court affected the decision.163 
 
159 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.  See id. at 867 (“So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most 
compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitima-
cy beyond any serious question.”). 
160 See, e.g., Gary C. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1437 (1979) (argu-
ing that Roe is the “classic example of judicial usurpation and fiat without reason”). 
161 Casey, 505 U.S. at 864–65. 
162 See Horwitz, supra note 153, at 36–37; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority:  The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 753 (1994) (“The decision in Casey not to overrule Roe v. Wade is 
predicated on the assumption that the Court currently has institutional legitimacy in the 
eyes of the American public, a legitimacy that protects the Court’s right to make decisions 
about abortion but a legitimacy that could be lost through an ill-considered decision re-
versing Roe.”); Wilson, supra note 68, at 1044–45 (“One reason Justice Souter affirmed 
Roe was to create the judicial constancy that would sustain overall public respect for the 
Supreme Court, even if many members of the public disliked the Court’s protecting 
women’s right to an abortion under the Constitution.”); Dion Farganis, Is the Supreme 
Court Bulletproof? 57, 60 (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Minnesota) (on file with author) (“[In Casey,] justices’ fears about the Court’s institution-
al well-being appears to have controlled the decision . . . [w]hat the Casey plurality is say-
ing, in effect is that for the good of the Court, Roe should not be overturned.”). 
163 See DAVIS, supra note 26, at 6 (The Court’s decision [in Casey] hewed closely to extant 
public opinion on abortion . . . .  [T]he opinion of the three justices in the plurality even 
acknowledged that they were responding to the public’s acceptance of the Roe deci-
sion.”); POSNER, supra note 143, at 275–76 (“In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in a joint opinion, let slip 
the mask . . . .”); Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 162, at 733 (“To summarize, the Casey Court 
argues for the importance of acting in ways that maintain the Court’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public and, through that legitimacy, the Court’s authoritativeness.”); Barry 
Friedman, Benched, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 2009, at 7,8, available at 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/benched (“Then there was Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the decision that didn’t overrule Roe v. Wade.  Why not?  It was 
hard to follow the plurality’s convoluted explanation, but looming large was anxiety 
about the Court’s public ‘legitimacy . . . .’”). 
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Following this logic, legality, at least in visible cases, can be refor-
mulated in terms of sociological legitimacy.  Sound legal reasoning is 
not the key for gaining sociological legitimacy.  The order is reversed: 
sociological legitimacy is the key for achieving legality.  If this re-
versed order seems familiar, it is because it is a depiction of how law is 
created by the political branches.  This is “the great process by which 
public opinion passes over into public will, which is legislation.”164  
The adoption of a judicial legitimation theory built upon this idea 
can mean nothing other than the collapse of the separation between 
law and politics at least in visible constitutional cases. 
Since legality and legitimacy are so closely intertwined, it is ex-
tremely hard to detect whether this reconceptualization of constitu-
tional decision-making—not as the product of legal expertise (with 
sociological legitimacy as a byproduct) but rather as the consequence 
of public opinion (with sociological legitimacy as its aim)—has be-
come a reality.165  Legal legitimacy is determined by the Court.  The 
Court can thus endow its judgments with a veil of legality even when 
they defy almost all of the standards of legality of their time.166  Such 
judgments are still the lawful acts of judicial officers who made their 
decisions according to legal procedure.  As such, these judgments are 
incorporated into the continuous strand of doctrine even when the 
entire contemporary legal community agrees that the judgments lack 
legal basis.167  Indeed, even in these exceptional cases, in which there 
is agreement among jurists that the Court’s decision can be under-
stood only as a retreat from legality, this retreat can be portrayed as a 
temporary move.  The Court retreats for a short period of time in or-
der to guard its sociological legitimacy, only so it can return to its 
usual adherence to the standards of legality.168  Moreover, the wide 
discretion judges have in interpreting many of the constitutional 
norms allows public opinion to creep into legal doctrine in a “legal” 
manner.169  Thus, no conflict between legality and legitimacy will sur-
 
164 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 178 (Kessinger Publishing 
2004) (1859). 
165 On the re-conceptualization, see Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:  
Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111 (2003). 
166 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 28–29, 71–73 (1999). 
167 See POSNER, supra note 143, at 41; Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between 
Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1444–47 (2001). 
168 Cf. Bassok, supra note 7, at 365–66 (discussing Bickel’s notion of passive virtues that are 
aimed at allowing the Court to avoid deciding cases in order to both protect its sociologi-
cal legitimacy and avoid corrupting the legal language). 
169 Id. at 357–58 (presenting the argument that public opinion functions in certain areas of 
constitutional law as a legitimate legal argument). 
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face as public opinion becomes a constitutive part of legal decision-
making; it will just become part of the “rule of law.”170  The only bar-
rier that can perhaps prevent such incorporation is a strong legal 
academy committed, over a long period of time, to doctrinally rigor-
ous scrutiny of the Court’s judgments.171 
IV.  THE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE LEGITIMATION THEORY 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, before the invention of 
public opinion polling, the connection between the Court’s legitima-
cy and public support for the Court was much less evident and thus 
public support was less crucial for the Court’s legitimacy discourse.172  
Since the 1880s and at least up until the invention of public opinion 
polls, the Court adhered to a legal expertise legitimation theory.  
This was arguably the natural choice for an unelected institution.173  
Yet, several decades afterwards, in a reality in which the public belief 
in Justices as legal experts has declined,174 the ability of expertise to 
serve as the basis for the Court’s legitimacy has eroded.175  While oth-
er unelected institutions, such as central banks, still base their under-
 
170 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics?  Harmonizing the Internal and 
External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (2005) (explaining 
how political preferences are incorporated to the idea of following the rule of law); Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1423–24 (2012) (reviewing 
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC (2010)) (“[B]ecause the Court itself is perceived as a source of legal authority, 
unlike the President, the Court will have more freedom of action to depart from the law 
without sanction.”). 
171 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
581, 588 (1989) (“Legislatures are subject to democratic checks upon their lawmaking.  
Judges less so, and federal judges not at all.  The only checks on the arbitrariness of fed-
eral judges are the insistence upon consistency and the application of the teaching of the 
mother of consistency, logic.”). 
172 See supra Part II. 
173 See Gibson, supra note 1, at 284 (arguing that courts base their legitimacy on expertise 
since they lack an electoral connection); Jurgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy:  A 
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 768–69 (2001) (“Again 
and again, civic republicans who are convinced that ‘all government is by the people’ 
bristle at the elite power of legal experts to void the decisions of a democratically elected 
legislature, although these experts themselves are not legitimated by a democratic majori-
ty but can only call on their technical competence in constitutional interpretation.”). 
174 See Bassok, supra note 68, at 247–53 (describing the erosion in public perception of the 
Court’s expertise); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust:  Contested Values and the Decline of 
Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) (“[M]any people no longer see judges as pos-
sessing legal expertise.”). 
175 See WHITE, supra note 67, at xii (arguing that the Court needed to develop a new basis of 
legitimacy that does not deny indeterminacy but also disassociates the Court from parti-
sanship). 
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standing of their legitimacy on expertise,176 this path has become less 
and less available for the Court.  Economics is still considered, in the 
public mind, as an area of expertise.  Law, at least in highly salient 
cases, has lost much of its expert allure.177 
According to the “public confidence” legitimation theory, the 
Court maintains its legitimacy as an institution by adhering, in visible 
cases, to the position that ensures public confidence for the Court.  
In the absence of public belief in its expertise, adhering to public 
opinion rather than to the directives of an expertise-based justifica-
tion theory may seem like the only viable tactic to ensure that the 
Court can maintain its enduring public support.178  Since reasoning 
that pleases public opinion may be different than reasoning that ad-
heres to the demands of doctrinal coherency or consistency,179 it is 
unsurprising that in visible cases the Rehnquist Court’s legal reason-
ing has been described as doctrinal disarray.180 
 
176 See Bassok, supra note 68, at 270–71 (“The situation of Federal Reserve Bank is telling in 
this regard.  Whether due to a lack of awareness of questions of accountability or a belief 
in apolitical expertise in the field of economics, the public supports this institution even 
though it is not elected and its policy decisions, at times, contradict public opinion.”); 
Gibson, supra note 1, at 284 (“Even in a democratic society, a wide variety of public-policy 
decisions are turned over to experts—for instance, much of the control of the economy is 
placed within the purview of relatively unaccountable institutions.  Such experts are sub-
ject to limited accountability; they are given the freedom to ‘do the right thing’ within the 
context of their expertise.”). 
177 See ENGEL, supra note 39, at 293 (arguing that due to the decline of the belief in a fix and 
singular legal meaning, “the Court seemed to lose any special claim to interpretive au-
thority”). 
178 Cf. ENGEL, supra note 39, at 15 (“[T]he Court has recently striven to justify its authority of 
majoritarian grounds.  Justices have emphasized the democratic credentials of their hold-
ings, stressing how they follow majoritarian trends, however defined, evident in the 
broader polity.”); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 601 
(1993) (“At any rate, examining the sources of constitutional decision makes increasingly 
apparent the extent to which judges seek to appeal to majoritarian values, if not to rely 
upon them entirely.”); Horwitz, supra note 153, at 40 (explaining that the plurality opin-
ion in Casey that focused on the decision’s effects on the public support of the Court 
“may also be symptomatic of a crisis of legitimacy in constitutional thought in which the 
generally accepted paradigms and modes of thought are no longer felt capable of yield-
ing convincing solutions to constitutional questions”). 
179 See, e.g, Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (2007) (“Badly-reasoned opinions may lack legal legitimacy, 
yet succeed in winning sociological legitimacy.  There may be a difference between rea-
sons that will please the Court’s audience and those that do the work of deciding cases.”). 
180 Compare Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005) (arguing that 
there is no doctrinal logic in the current constitutional disarray) with Alice Ristroph, Is 
Law?  Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 436–37 (2009) 
(“Tribe’s abandonment of his treatise seems to reflect a newly developed suspicion that 
there is no order obscured by the disorder.”). 
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The method for evaluating expert knowledge cannot be demo-
cratic.  Expert knowledge cannot be determined by the indiscrimi-
nate engagement of the public.181  As Robert Post stresses, “[t]he crea-
tion of reliable disciplinary knowledge must accordingly be relegated 
to institutions that are not controlled by the constitutional value of 
democratic legitimation.”182  Otherwise, a danger lurks that questions 
of expertise will be answered according to public opinion rather than 
according to disciplinary criteria.  Yet, a Court that adheres to the 
public confidence legitimation theory has created a situation in 
which legal expertise capitulates to the demands of public opinion.183 
In its endeavor to maintain its legitimacy, the Rehnquist Court’s 
institutional habit was to decide cases with a view of preserving public 
confidence in the Court.  The Court is an unaccountable institution, 
but direct accountability is not a necessary condition for maintaining 
public support.  The public awards the Court support since the pub-
lic confidence legitimation theory ensures that the Court is in sync 
with public opinion on the issues decided in salient cases most of the 
time. 
The public confidence legitimation theory does not mean that the 
Court is interested solely in corresponding to public opinion on the 
issues decided in salient cases.  Rather, it is interested in preserving 
public confidence in the Court.  Yet, over time, the Court cannot re-
peatedly fail the public opinion test in salient cases without under-
mining the logic of the public confidence legitimation theory.  A 
Court that makes too many decisions contrary to public opinion risks 
eroding its enduring public support—or so claims the public confi-
dence legitimation theory.184 
V.  THE MAJORITARIAN COURT THESIS REVISITED 
While many scholars now agree that the Rehnquist Court’s deci-
sions were in sync with public opinion as expressed in public opinion 
polls,185 this correlation does not necessarily confirm that the 
 
181 ROBERT C. POST, EXPERTISE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 29 (2012). 
182 Id. at 31. 
183 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 362–66 (discussing Bickel’s answer to the danger of capitulat-
ing the legal language to the demands of public opinion). 
184 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 18; Klarman, supra note 144, at 1751 (“[C]onstitutional rul-
ings that contravene overwhelming public opinion, at least on salient issues, do jeopard-
ize the Court’s standing.  No doubt cognizant of this reality, the Justices rarely have 
tempted fate by frustrating the wishes of dominant majorities.”). 
185 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 364–65 (“By the end of the Rehnquist Court, it was a 
widely acknowledged fact that the Court was mirroring public opinion.”); ROSEN, supra 
note 40, at 4 (“How did we get to this odd moment in American history where unelected 
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Rehnquist Court adopted the public confidence legitimation theory.  
The Court’s decisions may correlate to majority opinion, but the 
causal mechanism may not be the legitimation theory mechanism. 
Scholars have offered various mechanisms to explain how the 
Court’s decisions correspond to public opinion.186  For example, the 
sync may be achieved through the appointment mechanism.  As Rob-
ert Dahl first suggested, the appointment of new Justices to the 
Court, by the President with the consent of the Senate, ensures that 
periodic partisan realignments in the dominant governing coalition 
will be reflected in personnel changes in the Court.187 
Scholars argued in later studies that Dahl’s “dominant political 
coalition,” which controls the Court’s composition, serves as a proxy 
for the majority’s views.  In this manner, the sync between public 
opinion and the Court’s decisions is maintained.188  Thus, it is the 
changing makeup of the Court that ensures the correspondence of its 
decisions to public opinion, not its legitimation theory.  Indeed, even 
if the Court’s adjudication is directed somehow by public opinion, 
the mechanism is not necessarily a legitimation theory. 
Yet, the “public confidence” legitimation theory is able to explain 
a specific conundrum regarding the sync with public opinion during 
the Rehnquist Court era that most other mechanisms fail to explain.  
The eleven-year period from 1994 through 2005 was the longest the 
Court had gone without a change in membership since the Court’s 
size was fixed at nine Justices in 1869.189  In addition, no serious pub-
lic backlash occurred during those years, and the other two branches’ 
“weapons to control the justices look[ed] to have been ruled off the 
table or lost their force.”190  However, during this period, the Court 
 
Supreme Court Justices sometimes express the views of popular majorities more faithfully 
than the people’s elected representatives?”). 
186 See Pildes, supra note 117, at 126–42 (examining the different mechanisms offered). 
187 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); see also KECK, supra note 81, at 3 (examining “political ex-
planations” for Court’s decisions that followed Dahl’s line of thinking). 
188 See, e.g, Friedman, supra note 178, at 612 (“Although federal judges are not elected, they 
are appointed by Presidents who stand for popular election.  Judicial appointments often 
mirror the popular will that elected a President.”); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 84, at 148 
(contending that today, electoral responsiveness in Supreme Court appointments follows 
de facto from the politicization of the nomination and confirmation processes). 
189 See Linda Greenhouse, Access to Justice:  The Social Responsibility of Lawyers:  Change and Con-
tinuity on the Supreme Court, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2007). 
190 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 376; see also H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional 
Redemption, and Political Science:  Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098, 
1115 (2012) (“There have been virtually no serious attempts to ‘punish’ the Court for 
many years by things such as impeachment, changing the size of the Court, jurisdiction 
stripping, or even budget reduction.”). 
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was more in line with public opinion than ever before.191  This align-
ment between the Rehnquist Court’s decisions and public opinion 
posed a challenge for mechanisms that rely on the appointment pro-
cess or on public backlash. 
In light of this conundrum, Barry Friedman presented a theory of 
“quiet equilibrium,” or “marriage,” between the Court and public 
opinion.  In his book, Friedman offers an exhaustive account of “how 
public opinion has influenced the Supreme Court” (as the subtitle of 
his book proclaims) throughout its history.  He views the effect of 
public opinion as a continuous story, structurally unchanged 
throughout the Court’s entire history.192  While the Court has always 
been attentive to public opinion, only recently, after more than two 
hundred years, have the public and the Court understood how to in-
teract with each other effectively.  Today, “[t]he justices don’t actually 
have to get into trouble before retribution occurs; they can sense 
trouble and avoid it.”193  Yet, Friedman fails to recognize the great 
shift in the relationship between the Court and public opinion due to 
the entrance of scientific public opinion polls to the arena.194 
Public-opinion culture is so deeply ingrained in the current Amer-
ican social imaginary that it is hard to detect its influence.195  For ex-
ample, it is now natural in the media to speak of the position of the 
American people in a certain controversy, while referring to results of 
public opinion polls as evidence.  This way of perceiving the world 
was completely unnatural a few decades ago and completely impossi-
 
191 See, e.g, FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 353, 358–59, 376. 
192 See Richard Primus, Response:  Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1207, 1208–09 (2010) (“In Friedman’s telling, Justices throughout history have de-
cided cases by tempering their first-order preferences with their knowledge, or at least 
their best guesses, as to what the public will bear.”); see also ROSEN, supra note 40, at 7 
(“[T]hroughout American history, judges have tended to reflect the wishes of national 
majorities and have tended to get slapped down on the rare occasions when they have 
tried to thwart majority will.”). 
193 FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 376.  See Barry Friedman, Reply:  The Will of the People and the 
Process of Constitutional Change, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (2010) (“[I]f the system 
is in equilibrium, little will be observed in the way of overt struggle.”). 
194 However, at times, it does seem that Friedman detects the occurrence of a change though 
not its causes.  See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 336 (1998) (“It might strike many as 
paradoxical, to say the least, that the scope of constitutional protections has been defined 
so often with reference to the preferences of popular majorities.  Yet, that has been the 
result of the Court’s adherence to the ‘majoritarian paradigm’ that came to dominate 
constitutional law in the latter half of the twentieth century.” (emphasis added)). 
195 For a discussion of the notion of social imaginary and the manner in which it blocks our 
horizons, see TAYLOR, supra note 3. 
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ble before the invention of public opinion polling.196  Thus, Friedman 
views the past through the current culture, failing to detect the great 
shift in the relationship between public opinion and institutions due 
to the rise of the public opinion culture since the 1980s.  For exam-
ple, he finds it hard to explain the Warren Court’s judgments that 
went against public opinion, such as the “Communist cases” and the 
school prayer cases.197  Rather than adopt Bickel’s “bet of the future” 
diagnosis for an era before the rise of public opinion culture, he re-
sorts to claims of “miscalculation of public sentiments” by the Court198 
that expose his theory to accusations of unfalsifiability.  According to 
this claim, decisions by the Court contrary to public opinion can still 
be explained according to Friedman’s theory as a miscalculation of 
public reaction by the Court.  Thus, no decision by the Court, no 
matter how countermajoritarian it would be, can falsify his theory.199 
Tom Clark presents an empirical study that explains the sync be-
tween public opinion and the Court’s decisions.  Clark argues that 
the introduction of Court-curbing bills serves as a signal of waning 
public support for the Court.200  The Court learns about public opin-
ion mainly from Court-curbing threats emanating from Congress.201  
A rise in the number of these signals of public discontent leads to ju-
dicial self-restraint, according to Clark.202 
Clark’s theory is one example of a very dominant approach:  the 
“strategic behavior model.”  The strategic behavior approach portrays 
 
196 See Bassok, supra note 7, at 337–39 (describing the shift from a period in which “Congress 
was public opinion” to the period in which “Congress was no longer considered as the 
voice of the popular will, rather, opinion polls were”). 
197 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 238, 250, 264. 
198 See Id. at 250 (“Then, in what only could have been a miscalculation of public sentiments, 
during the 1956 term the Court handed down twelve decisions in domestic security cases, 
every single one of which defended the rights suspected Communists and fellow travel-
ers.”); id. at 252–53, 264–265 (“The justices’ surprise at the public backlash suggests that 
they had miscalculated public opinion on the issue [of school prayer] . . . .”). 
199 See Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 783 (2011) (criticizing 
Friedman’s theory as nonfalsifiable thus preventing “assessment of the theory’s validity”). 
200 CLARK, supra note 13, at 20–21 (“Court-curbing . . . may simply be a proxy for a number 
of elements in the political environment.  Other forms of information come to the Court 
about public support, types that are less easily quantifiable.”), 
201 Id. at 18–19 (arguing that “best signal for the Court” of public opinion are Court-curbing 
proposals in Congress); id. at 193–94 (“I have argued that Congress serves an important 
intermediary role, communicating public opinion to the Court.”); id. at 251–52, 256–57, 
266–67 (“Court-curbing bills are, I believe, the primary institutional signal that conveys 
information to the Court about its public legitimacy.”). 
202 Id. at 175–80, 187 (“The Supreme Court responds to Court-curbing by exercising self-
restraint in its constitutional cases . . . .”); id. at 193 (“The results of the statistical analysis 
provide evidence that a concern for its institutional legitimacy motivates the Supreme 
Court to exercise self-restraint.”). 
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the Justices as strategic players, who anticipate the reaction of the 
public and other majoritarian political players and adjust their deci-
sions accordingly.203  This approach and the public confidence legiti-
mation theory share a picture of the Court as an institution con-
cerned for its institutional legitimacy and public prestige.204  Yet, 
according to the public confidence legitimation theory, the Court’s 
main source of knowledge of its public support is public opinion 
polls measuring that support.  Clark ignores opinion polls as an in-
dependent source of data that affects the Justices’ mindset,205 and ar-
gues that “the Supreme Court, although it has beliefs about public 
opinion, is less well informed about public support for the Court 
than is Congress.”206  Yet, one important effect of the invention of 
public opinion polls is the Court’s ability to cut the intermediary to 
public opinion.  No longer is Congress the sole representation of 
public opinion.207  The Court no longer needs to infer the status of its 
public support from the actions of the elected branches.  Moreover, 
these branches cannot claim a monopoly anymore in representing 
public views of the Court.  The Court now has an indicator of its 
popular support that is public and considered reliable.  Indeed, pub-
lic opinion polls currently serve as mechanisms of legitimation in 
public discourse, while Clark views them as mere measurement tools. 
The idea that public opinion polls have shifted the institutional 
balance of power by creating an independent indicator of public 
support for the Court is completely absent from Clark’s account.  
Much like Friedman, Clark describes the relationship between the 
Court and public opinion as a story in which the rise of public opin-
ion polls does not cause any shift in the institutional balance of pow-
 
203 See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 161–63 
(2012) (discussing the strategic behavior explanation). 
204 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 187 (“The evidence paints a picture of a Court concerned for 
its legitimacy and learning from the political environment about how treacherous the po-
litical waters may be.”); id. at 250, 258 (distinguishing his work from the work of scholars 
who argue that the Court is interested in implementing its policies). 
205 See id. at 94, 267 (specifying the sources from which the Court learns of his public support 
without acknowledging the role of public opinion polls). 
206 Id. at 87. 
207 See Fried & Harris, supra note 18, at 341 (describing the situation before the invention of 
public opinion polls when Congress was public opinion).  Cf. CLARK, supra note 13, at 202 
n.44 (“Congress, I believe, is most closely tied to the public and therefore offers perhaps 
the most carefully calibrated representation of public opinion.”); id. at 257, 260–61 
(“[T]he influence of public opinion of the Court is mediated by elected representatives, 
who can serve to communicate the breadth and depth of public discontent with the 
Court.”). 
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er.208  As other strategic behavior models, Clark’s model suggests that 
the Rehnquist Court’s orientation toward public opinion was no dif-
ferent than that of previous Courts.  In my depiction of the Court, 
there were periods in which the Court held a legitimation theory that 
did not lead it to follow public opinion. 
Moreover, the strategic approach repudiates the claim that ideas 
have a substantial influence over the Court’s adjudication.  According 
to this approach, external material incentives, rather than legal-
interpretive schemes, are the major driving force in keeping the sync 
between public opinion and the Court’s adjudication.209  I agree that 
theories of interpretation by themselves are not central to explaining 
the Court’s adherence to public opinion.210  However, I argue that 
changes in the Court’s understanding of how it gains public support 
are crucial for explaining such an adherence.  Thus, changes in ideas 
concerning public support for the Court are central for understand-
ing changes in the Court’s adjudication (including changes in its in-
terpretative theories).211  For example, the shift in the Court’s legiti-
mation theory fits the depiction of the Rehnquist Court as minimalist 
both in its tendency since 1995 to decide fewer cases and to avoid 
controversial salient issues,212 and in its inclination to decide salient 
cases on a narrow and shallow basis, leaving many issues of basic 
 
208 See CLARK, supra note 13, at 193 (“The statistical analysis of judicial review from 1877 
through the present demonstrates that when Court-curbing bills are introduced in Con-
gress, the justices will exercise self-restraint by attenuating their use of judicial review to 
invalidate federal legislation.”); id. at 259 (“The existing research considering how public 
support for the judiciary affects the balance of power between courts and elected branch-
es has not considered the implications of the elected branches’ informational advantage 
over the courts in matters of public opinion . . . .”). 
209 See Pildes, supra note 170, at 1404–05 (describing how rational-choice theories under-
stand the behavior of judges and other public officials wholly in terms of the material in-
centives rather than in terms of internal sense of doctrinal legal constraint). 
210 See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 69, at 19, 91–93 (“Generally speaking, judges 
have responded to changing social and political mobilization for the institutional reasons 
I have identified above, and they have done so regardless of their normative interpreta-
tive theories.”). 
211 See Bassok, supra note 68, at 266–67 (explaining the rise of originalism as a result of the 
anxiety from the decline of the Court’s image as an expert). 
212 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:  A Preliminary Analysis, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 578–85 (2003) (arguing that after 1994, the Rehnquist Court avoid-
ed “culture war” issues and focused on less salient issues such as Federalism; noting that 
the Court’s shrinking docket “is a central mystery of the second Rehnquist Court” as the 
Court reduced its power to influence policy).  See also id. at 637–38 (“[T]he Court turned 
away from social issues . . . because Justices O’Connor and Kennedy found the costs of 
continuing to engage with these issues in terms of public opinion to be unacceptably 
high.”). 
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principle undecided.213  Attentive to public confidence for the Court 
more than in previous periods, the Rehnquist Court attempted, ac-
cording to this line of thought, to avoid decisions and forms of rea-
soning that would jeopardize its enduring public support. 
Several other scholars have exposed the manner in which the 
Court has incorporated public opinion into legal discourse as a legit-
imate source for constitutional interpretation.214  Utilizing indetermi-
nate phrases in the Constitution, the Court is able to imbue public 
opinion into its interpretation and thus invalidate a “statute if it no 
longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends in popular opinion 
are running against it.”215  In that manner, the Court can ensure cor-
respondence in certain areas of law between its decisions and public 
opinion.  As opposed to these scholars, my claim is not that public 
opinion became a legitimate source in professional constitutional 
discourse.  I am not searching for the legal channels through which 
public opinion infiltrates and flows into the legal discourse.  My ar-
gument is not based on a change in the sources for deciding cases.  I 
argue that there has been a change in the institutional dynamics fol-
lowing the rise of public opinion polls that measure public support 
for the Court and in the way the Court understands how it gains pub-
lic support.  The shift in the Court’s legitimation theory may explain 
why the Court opened routes for public opinion to enter constitu-
tional discourse as a legitimate constitutional source. 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of the nineteenth century, James Bryce predicted that 
if the “will of the majority of citizens were to become ascertainable at 
all times . . . public opinion would not only reign but govern.”216  In 
 
213 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
xi (1999) (“The current Supreme Court embraces minimalism.  Indeed, judicial minimal-
ism has been the most striking feature of American law in the 1990s.”). 
214 See, e.g., Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 1, 6, 8–9, 18–19 (2007). 
215 See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 893–
95 (2009) (demonstrating how over the last generation or so, the Court accommodates 
trends in public opinion through interpreting open-ended text such as the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment or through the application of the 
“intermediate scrutiny” test in judging sex classification under the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also Primus, supra note 214, at 20–28 (describing how public consensus can 
serve as a referent in constitutional decision-making either through indeterminate con-
cepts such as “equal protection” or “standing on its own bottom” as an “input into consti-
tutional analysis” which affects constitutional meaning). 
216 BRYCE, supra note 4, at 919. 
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1962, Bickel wrote that “[s]urely the political institutions are more fit-
ted than the Court to find and express an existing consensus—so 
long, at least, as the science of opinion sampling is no further devel-
oped than it is.”217  Public opinion still did not reign, and Bickel still 
adhered to the position that the Court is a unique institution in that 
“insofar as is humanly possible,” it “is concerned only with principle” 
and not with “electoral responsibility.”218  Bruce Ackerman has recent-
ly showed that Bryce’s prediction has become reality because polls 
“not only supplement, but displace, election returns as the authorita-
tive democratic legitimator.”219  The creation of a “public opinion cul-
ture” has not left the Court untouched.  Opinion polls’ new status as 
democratic legitimators has changed the balance of power between 
the branches.  For the first time in history, a metric that is considered 
by the public and the other branches as a reliable measure of public 
opinion continually demonstrated for several decades that the “Court 
has consistently been the most favored institution of government.”220  
Public support as a basis of legitimacy is no longer the monopoly of 
the elected branches.  The Court can now rely, even if only tacitly, on 
public support for the Court as a viable, independent basis of legiti-
macy.221 
In addition, the rise in saliency of the indeterminacy difficulty ex-
posed that legal expertise by itself does not equip the Court with the 
ability to find the correct answer in visible cases.  The combination of 
the Court’s inability to base its legitimacy on expertise and public 
support for the Court as a new available source of legitimacy brought 
a great shift in the Court’s self-understanding of its sources of legiti-
macy.  By the time of the Rehnquist Court, the Court was unable  
anymore to adopt an expertise-based normative justification, such as 
the Carolene Products criterion,222 as its guiding star.223  Instead, in sali-
 
217 BICKEL, supra note 7, at 239. 
218 Id.  at 25–26, 68–69. 
219 ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 14.  See Fried & Harris, supra note 18, at 321 (“By the turn of 
the twenty-first century, bureaucrats and politicians in the United States were governing 
with the polls.”). 
220 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:  AMERICANS’ BELIEFS 
ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK  99 (2002). 
221 Cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 148–49 (1999) 
(noting that since the Burger Court era, the Court took the “opportunity to act relatively 
freely to develop its own constituency of support”). 
222 Cf. John Hart Ely, Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword:  On Discovering Fundamental Values, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5–6 (1978) (“Generally speaking, the Warren Court was a Carolene 
Products Court, centrally concerned with assuring broad participation, not simply in the 
processes of government but in the benefits generated by those processes as well.” (inter-
nal footnote omitted)); KECK, supra note 81, at 72 (“[B]oth contemporary critics and sub-
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ent cases, the Court chose a different criterion, made available by the 
rise of opinion polls:  public support for the Court.  The Court’s so-
ciological legitimacy became its guiding star. 
Thus, the combination of the rise of public polling, the rise of sa-
liency of the indeterminacy of constitutional norms, and the lessons 
the Court learned from unrepresentative, unique periods during 
which the Court was “a central player in the dominant issue of the 
times,”224 created the conditions for the rise of the public confidence 
legitimation theory during the Rehnquist era.  The Court became the 
perfect institution of “stealth democracy,” responsive to public opin-
ion without requiring the messy democratic process to receive input 
from the public.225  Ironically, a Court guided by the public confi-
dence legitimation theory allows the public to obtain its preferences 
while avoiding the daily confrontation with the painful responsibility 
to deliberate and decide its own destiny. 
 
sequent historians have described the Warren Court by reference to Stone’s influential 
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225 HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 220, at 4 (“People do not want responsiveness and 
accountability in government; they want responsiveness and accountability to be unneces-
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